Thank you.
I didn’t think it was a rhetorical device, but would you mind deleting the double post?
Someone reading along might have something helpful to say, if not distracted by double posts that have even less to do with the op than quantum theory.
The limerick was clever, and I look forward to any more you might have to say.
Thank you.
Hi Michael –
It’s the first time I’ve ever deleted a post – I didn’t know it was possible!
Indeed this is so – and that shows to me that there is a paradox in Freud that he never resolved because of his through-going materialism. Freudian psychoanalysis has the hidden assumption that we can become more free, more in control, have greater agency etc. (and I don’t think Freud examined this hidden assumption - his rationalism had made it hidden from him I guess). IF Freud had been true to his determinist assumptions he would have thought the process of psychoanalysis to be futile – as case of one tape recorder (the analyst) not communicating with another tape recorder (the person being analysed).
This is true – and Stalin another Marxist determinist – saw it fitting to liquidate whole groups of people for expediency yes – but also because they were on the wrong side of the deterministic mechanism of history and had to be sacrificed to ‘history’. Marxist humanists rejected this determinism, came out of denial over the legacy of Stalin, and embraced democracy.
Agreed: so the major difference between deterministic materialism and hyper Calvinist determinism – just in this sense – is that the end of history and of each human life is directed towards good ends? Is this so?
I’m sure that’s so and I’m open to being described as some sort of compatibilist – although my view of determinism is ‘soft’ and paradoxical allowing for a limited but important measure of freedom.
I don’t know the open theism literature so it’s difficult for me to say about Pog. Regarding freedom as a useful legal concept – I understand that most determinists are consequentialist/utilitarian in their ethics. They are not interested in ethics from the point of view of the individual (since the individual cannot be seen to be a free ethical agent). Therefore their view of say criminal punishment is constructed from the standpoint of the good effects of punishment for society (they focus on deterrence arguments). However, some schools of utilitarianism make a concession that in a free society wherever a consequentialist ruling goes against moral intuitions (like punishing an innocent person to deter a riot) then other criteria should be used – because in a free society the truth will out eventually and punishment of the innocent will bring the law into disrepute). I’m never sure what the implications of a deterministic theology would be for crime and punishment in this life.
Ok I have done an excursus here – but the excursus did arise from examples you gave to Pog. I’ve given some hints above that you can question me further on/pull me up on regarding the topic and get me focussed. Pick them up and I’m happy to go a couple of rounds with you.
All the best
Dick
I don’t think Freud would agree that psychoanalysis has any hidden assumptions that we can have greater agency.
I think he’d see his theories as a natural development arising out of his time and place, and I think he believed that those hereditarilly, socially, and economically able to benefit from the long (and sometimes expensive) process of psychoanalysis would benefit from it (and I’m sure he saw it all as predetermined by evolution, biology, history, and individual circumstances, though he may not have always found it expedient to emphasize that pov.)
I’m not looking to win any debates, I’m just looking to understand certain things.
Thank you.
You did say one thing that interests me.
That’s always been my position, but positing a God with libertarian free will sometimes seems the only way to answer some of the questions I have.
Questions like why God would choose the third planet in this solar system to be the only one with intelligent biological life (or why this planet, in this solar system to be the center of salvation history, and the place of His son’s incarnation, if there’s life on more than one planet)?
Contingency does seem to exist, and the simplest way to explain it would seem to be that God made certain choices for no particular rational reason.
So the questions I would have for you are:
1.) What is “libertarian free will”?
2.) Can we even define what it means?
(An agnostic on another forum suggested that each libertarian free will would be “a little random decision generator as far as God knows,” but when I try to think about that, I have the same problem I have with the self tossing, rolling, stopping dice.)
3.) Does it exist?
4.) Can God create and instill this quality in a derivative being?
(If we accept the agnostic’s definition of libertarian free will, can God create “little random decision generators”?)
5.) Does compatibilism make more sense (and if so, does that mean that even God has no “libertarian” free will, and how do we explain contingency)?
P.S. This is from a blog I quoted in my last post to pog.
philochristos.blogspot.com/2006/01/does-god-have-free-will.html
Hi Michael –
Sorry about the quip concerning doing a couple of rounds with you – I was echoing Alex’s merry quip on another thread about being beaten up by philosophers 
.
If I could begin by making an observation about the post you quote above. There is something I’d like to clarify which I think will help our discussion-The poster states that -
Actually the poster is mistaken here – and this means in my view they need to rethink what they are sketching out in the rest of the post. The poster is not describing compatibilism but rather John Stuart Mill’s argument against libertarianism. Mill argues that when we seem to choose between two different intentions, desires or motivation it seems in memory that we made a choice. However, all that really happened was that the strongest desire, intention, motivation won out (and therefore what seemed like our choice did not involve our ‘agency’).
Determinists argue that all our mental states and acts, including choices and decisions, and all our actions are necessitated by preceding causes. Thus our futures are in fact fixed and unalterable in much the same way that the past is. In theological traditions of determinism that which necessitates our actions is either/or both/and Gods’ omniscient foreknowledge; God’s omnipotent sovereign majesty (that will not allow secondary causes); and, in Universalist Determinism – I guess – God’s omni-benevolence to bring all things to the good. In modern philosophy – determinism is based in the materialist, mechanistic world picture of the contemporary physical sciences. When we use terms like ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’ I think we need to be careful. There may be equivalents in theological discourse, but these terms actually come from discussion about mechanistic materialism and its practical implications for ethics. In secular ethical philosophy these terms are used thus (with thanks for the Oxford Companion to Philosophy for clarification)
Some philosophers, incompatibilists, believe that freedom and determinism are incompatible
Some argue that determinism if true destroys moral responsibility undermines interpersonal relations, and destroys our life hopes by making all actions un-free (these philosophers may be almost convinced by the objectivist account of determinism no one level – but remain agnostic about the completeness of its description of things because of its inability to account for the ‘subjectivity’ that makes us human)
There are also incompatibilists that believe that determinism is false, and hence that our actions are morally responsible (often called libertarians)
In addition there are incompatibilists who believe that determinism is true, and moral responsibility is therefore an illusion. These are often called ‘hard determinists’ (the term was coined by William James).
Other philosophers- compatibilists – deny that determinism has any such effect on moral responsibility and argue that freedom and determinism are compatible. They argue that the sense of ‘free’ in which actions must be free in order to be morally responsible is not in terms of being uncaused acts of independent origination, but in terms of being not coerced – a gun to the head, a hellfire sermon, blackmail etc. This position was set out coherently by G.E. Moore – and it relies on the everyday common sense use of the word ‘free’ rather than its objective and ‘scientific usage. But incompatibilists argue this is a trick with words –because actions that are not externally compelled are still part of a chain of causation in the determinist account
So I wonder where you might stand according to these definitions? (I’ve treble checked the definitions with other sources rather than just depending on memory or a single source). And I wonder how you think your chosen position might be compatible with your theology?
Hope this is useful old chum – it might open up the discussion fruitfully (but I already have more to say)
All the best
Dick 
Michael I’ve just read a post from another thread by you. We are the same age and some of our circumstances are quite similar. I pray for you and hope we can have a chat that will be of help to you.
Bless you brother
Dick
I don’t have a chosen position, I’m trying to understand “free will.”
And if libertarian free will means the “freedom” to do things for no real reason, it makes no sense to me.
That sounds more like being a slave to the random fluctuations of your own mind than “free” in any sense of the word that seems meaningful to me, and I don’t see how I can “chose” to believe in a position that makes no sense to me.
I still remember a long telephone conversation I had with Jim Coram (who was president of the Concordant Publishing Concern back when I subscribed to “Unsearchable Riches,” and who I think still is) in which he did most of the talking, and in which he argued that indeterminism was impossible in any universe, with or without a Supreme Being.
I think you’d have to classify him as more of a Theologian than a secular Philosopher (and he was in perfect agreement with John Stuart Mill’s argument against libertarianism), so the terms “compatibilism” and “incompatibilism” seem to apply to both Theological and Philosophical points of view (and if that causes some confusion, I see no way to avoid it.)
What I see as relevant here are questions like what we mean when we speak of human “free will,” or “agency”?
Do we mean humans are made with some built-in “random decision generator”?
If so, many would argue (as I think pog would) that the randomness is based on some connection between the human mind (or brain) and quantum flux, but I see that as irrelevant.
Without or without quantum theory, the difficulty I have with the idea of “random decision generators” is that I can’t see how they could be truly undetermined, random, or unpredictable in relation to God.
I can set something in motion, close my eyes, take hands off, and be surprised by what happens because I’m not God, but how does anything happen if God takes hands off?
An agnostic on another forum suggested (quit sarcastically) that once you invoke the supernatural you can explain anything.
God (he said) could just say “let there be a little black box, and let random particles just come out of it,” but could He?
How could He create “random decision generators”?
Now here’s the problem I have with compatibilism (or whatever it is that you’d like to call John Stuart Mill’s position.)
If the acts of the will are always determined by the strongest motivation, how do you explain contingency?
How could God chose between two or more perfectly good alternatives, and produce a solar system with 9 planets, a milky way with how ever many stars it has, etc. etc.
I still don’t understand what we mean by “libertarian free will,” but it almost seems as though God (at least) would have to have such a faculty to create a universe where so many things seem arbitrary and contingent.
This is why I say I don’t have a chosen position here.
I’m trying to understand things, and if you (or anyone else) can help me, I thank you.
Please do.
Will have a think Michael -
Give me a while to ponder. Happy New Year; I wasn’t being pedantic about the definition of compatibilism’ - I just needed to clarify things for myself. Now I know that it is John Stuart Mills argument about the choice of our wills being an illusion - when actually it is imsply the strongest desire in us that makes us seem to chose - it helps me to focus.
The trouble with philosophy Michael is that so much of it seems to be about refining the questions rather than producing the answers (but that’s the nature of the beast).
I hope and pray you learn to rest more easy with questions of intellect - we are limited creatures and our intellectual grasp of ‘things entire’ will always remain partial and divided in my view.
All the best
Dick
Michael, I have given a definition of “libertarian free will.” Can you accept it? I have stated (perhaps not in these exact words) that one has exercised free will when he has performed some act A, such that he could have refrained from performing that act. I have also stated that the free will agent is himself the cause of his chosen acts, and we need not look for other causes.
As I see it, “compatibilist free will” is not free will at all. It’s definition of “free will” is that a person exercises free will if he performs an act for which there is no external contraint to his performing that act. But the compatibilist, like the determinist affirms that if an agent has performed some act A, he couldn’t have done otherwise.
“Libertarian free will” does NOT imply that the agent performs an act for no reason. Nevertheless that reason, whatever it is, does not FORCE the agent to perform that act. He could have refrained from performing that act.
Of course you can always say that if the agent had refrained from performing the act, there must have been another reason for his doing so, and that THIS was the cause of his act. This kind of reasoning begs the question. It assumes in advance, that the agent does not have free will. For a person who thinks this way, no definition of free will is possible since free will is presumed in advance not to exist.
I don’t know.
I mentioned a telephone conversation I once had with Jim Coram (President of the Concordant Publishing Concern, and Editor of “Unsearchable Riches” magazine), and the thing that impressed me most about him was that he seemed much smarter than I was, and the power of contrary choice (or what he called “categorical could-have-done-otherwiseness”) is precisely what he said was “impossible in any universe, with or without a Supreme Being.”
This was years ago, it was all academic then, and I can’t remember the conversation word for word.
But I did find something he wrote on the subject, and I’d like to compare some of the things you say to some of the things he says.
You:
Jim Coram:
groups.yahoo.com/group/determinism/message/3259
You:
Jim Coram:
groups.yahoo.com/group/determinism/message/3259
You:
Jim Coram:
groups.yahoo.com/group/determinism/message/3259
You:
Jim Coram:
groups.yahoo.com/group/determinism/message/3259
pog:
Jim Coram:
groups.yahoo.com/group/determinism/message/3259
If what Mr. Coram is saying is true, and “categorical could-have-done-otherwiseness” is impossible, I don’t see how even God could have free will, or make arbitrary choices, or how we could have contingency in the universe.
But I can’t say I really see the flaws in his logic either.
If you, or Dick, or Pog (or anyone else) can point them out to me, I’d be truly grateful.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I’m trying to think it through too, and I appreciate any help you can give me.
Whatever you call the view expressed by John Stuart Mills, Jim Coram holds much the same view.
groups.yahoo.com/group/determinism/message/3259
(Please see my reply to Paidion.)
Please do.
I stopped celebrating all holidays over two years ago, but thanks for the thought, and happy new year to you.
Thank you again.
I’m trying to think this thru too, and I appreciate any help you can offer.
Hi Michael –
Regarding Jim Coram of Concordant publishing – I’m English and I’ve never met a hyper-Calvinist, let alone a hyper-Calvinist Universalist; I’ve only become aware of their existence very recently.
Auggy has written about them -he’s obviously ruminating on the hyper Calvinist case at the moment too – however, his concerns were about the passages in the epistle to the Romans’ about God ‘hardening Pharaoh’s heart.
James (Goetz) has alluded to them in a thread about soteriological inclusivism (and I’m so green about their arguments that I completely misunderstood his use of inclusivism). Do the Concordant hyper Calvinists teach that repentance is somehow not necessary for salvation – God just saves everybody no matter what (this is what James found untenable)?
I think my friend Puddy is a Concordant Christian. He’s very open minded but it seems that the Concordant Christian beliefs he has are rooted in dispensationalist thinking – sort of the Darby/Scofield shtick with a Universalist eschatology rather than an ECT one.
So I’m a bit green about the likes of Jim Coram and where he was/they are coming from. Yes he has given an intelligent and concise summary of the determinist case against libertarianism in the passage that you quote. He’s not done this on theological grounds –he’s done it by putting forward the case of materialist philosophers, who have modelled their ‘objectivity’ on the modern physical sciences that describe everything complex in terms of simple causes (a philosophical tradition that can be traced to the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, who was an opponent of Christian belief). That’s surprising – because I would think that he would also reject other forms of Enlightenment knowledge such as historical, scientific and literary criticism of the Bible; although this observation about hum cherry picking does not settle any arguments.
What does bother me about what Jim Coram said to you is that it clearly hasn’t been a source of courage or comfort to you. It seems to be a bit like a prison built of logic that you cannot find your way out of. I hope chinks of light do come to you.
Can I just say for starters that although obviously all Christian universalists (even Johnny 
) are going to laud the eschatological universalism and rejection of ‘Theo-sadism’ by hyper Calvinists like Jim Coram – there’s obviously something unsatisfying and frustrating – indeed oppressive – that I, you and others find in their account of human action (and maybe even Divine action?). I don’t think it has anything necessarily to do with our smug ad unmerciful attitude to criminals or other sinners (which is a point worth picking up later and testing out). I think it is rather that the hyper Calvinist account of universalism – like the TULIP Calvinist account of ECT, and the atheist materialist’s deterministic account of human action – leave out purpose from their account of human action. Propose is not only an issue with criminal acts – which philosophical conversations about freewill always tend to concentre on; it is also an issue with truly creative acts that lead to human flourishing. and it is very difficult to inhabit a purposeless worldview – of which we are essentially nothing but epiphenomena of natural or divine determinism - without succumbing to fatalism (if we really are going to take it as the only true account of human action)
That’s my thoughts for starters. I’ve plenty more to say. I’d like t have a look at libertarianism next – including a consideration of Pog’s and Don’s arguments.
All the best
Dick
Some thoughts on the case against libertarianism
As I understand it the nub of the contemporary determinist case against freewill – in terms of ‘the ability to choose otherwise’ and therefore to be held ultimately responsible for our actions is as outlined by me below:
All of our actions are the result of prior causes – in a the most general sense we didn’t choose to be born, to be human, to be born into a particular culture, into a particular family, with a particular genetic makeup and brain chemistry etc. The only way we could be held ultimately responsible for our actions would be if we were the first cause doing the fine tuning of the conditions in the big bang (so to speak). This is what philosophers call ‘metaphysical freedom’ -an imagined state of being totally free of causal laws where we have the power to choose which way the future will take.
If this is what we mean by freedom –than clearly we are un-free. The only people I know of who in anyway appropriate this idea of full scale libertarianism are the adherents of Christian Science/ American New Thought/Positive Thinking/ wilder fringes of Humanistic Psychology. They actually refuse to believe in the constraints of embodied life and chant the mantra that – ‘You create your own reality’ – as a universal explanation and motivator. There are all sorts of practical problems obviously in holding to this belief system - but try telling this to the converted! 
- and it is often underpinned by a total misuse and over generalisation of the science of quantum mechanics (at least these days) – way beyond the more modest and appropriate speculations made by Pog earlier in this thread. I note that New Thought arose in the nineteenth century in America as an antidote to the paralysis of the will that many experienced by an overload of Calvinistic determinism.
Another argument against libertarianism is that one of the things that constitute what we call ‘freedom’ is being able to act within a fairly dependable and predictable pattern. Yes that is a paradox – what we call freedom (not metaphysical freedom as described above, but rather the empirical freedom that has been described and advocated so eloquently by Don) has to happen within a patterned and lawful context. If my arm randomly jerks and strikes someone in an indeterministic way, I am no freer in a metaphysical sense than if I am determined; and the world has suddenly become even crazier since without causal links everything is random. There must be some sort of causal link between my action and my past life for it to make any sense to think of it as my action.
So OK that’s the fuller case against metaphysical libertarianism as I undersand it. I will leave the idea of whether or not God is in some ways also determined in terms of God’s creative choices for a later post. Next I will look at the case against hard determinism if that’s OK?
All the best
Dick
Hey Michael
Thank you for generating a discussion on this topic. You seem to be a very intelligent person, and yes, you have brought up many great points. I likely do not have much to contribute.
If you are interested, Jim Coram has an 8 tape series you can listen to at concordant.org/ titled ‘Human Choice and the diety of God’
I used to wonder why Jim Coram was so philosophical on this topic, but I feel some of the reason must be his attempt to reach others with what is an important scriptural truth. Recognizing the Diety of God brings a great deal of peace to concordant believers. I believe It can help bring you some peace, too!
“seeing that out of Him and through Him and for Him is all: to Him be the glory for the eons! Amen!” Ro. 11.36
Puddy
Hi Puddy – good to hear your written voice again old chum. Ah and that clarifies for me that you are a determinist.
Michael please forgive me if i have this wrong – but I thought that you were somewhat perplexed and unhappy with trying to think theological determinism in your blood and bones rather than simply holding to it notionally. If it does bring you peace – and I know it can, being sublime peace to some of complete surrender– forgive me for misreading you.
I really don’t want this thread to become a battle between Concordant hyper Calvinists and people like me – Incarnationlist Christians who do have an important place for freewill in our Christian worldview, albeit a modest and humble one (but I certainly don’t subscribe to a Gospel of works, a Gospel of smug). I will argue in favour of freewill of sorts and clarify my thinking –but this is not an attack on you. There is latitude in the Christian faith – at least there is in our online community. It is wonderful that we are all Christian Universalists!
All the best
Dick
I’m very interested in your thoughts (and any supporting logic you can offer.)
Please say more (particularly on the topic of whether God has free will, and how He could create it in a creature.)
Here’s the problem I have with pog’s quantum mechanics based speculation.
If you’re a traditional monotheist, the idea (or theory) that particles behave in a completely random, undirected, and undetermined way (totally unpredictable, not only to human observers, but to God Himself), seems to imply that God creates these particles and the realm they move in, and then somehow takes hands off and lets whatever happens happen.
The question is, how could anything happen?
The problem is (and I think Lewis saw this) is that it seems philosophically, logically impossible that mindless particles could do anything, if God closes His eyes and takes His hands off.
The problem I’m now having with the concept of libertarian free will is that (ever since an agnostic on another forum suggested that each individual libertarian free will would be a random decision generator as far as God is concerned) I’ve come to think of it somewhat like this hypothetical quantum chaos field that pog kept wanting to talk about here.
I don’t see how God could create fields where particles just do things on their own, and I don’t see how He could create “random decision generators” (if that’s what libertarian free wills are.)
Do you?
Can you help me?
I don’t remember asking Jim if God has libertarian free will, and I don’t know what he would have said, but his logic would seem to lead to the conclusion that there is no such thing (even for God.)
The concordant view is that all is out of Him, and through Him, and to Him, and that this ultimately includes all human behavior, and all human history.
In an oft quoted passage, Joseph says his brothers sold him into slavery in Egypt because they meant him evil, but God meant it for good, to preserve many lives.
The Concordant view is that Joseph’s brothers are accountable (but not responsible) for their bad motives, but really did no more than God’s will (and even their bad motives were produced by their father’s favoritism toward Joseph, Joseph’s God-given dreams, and Joseph’s unwise sharing of those dreams–all within God’s plan.)
All that served a purpose, and all that’s fine and dandy, but what about all the things in nature and history that seem truly arbitrary, and don’t seem to serve any particular purpose at all?
Without something like libertarian free will, how could God make arbitrary choices?
For example, I recently learned that every human alphabet seems to be based on the Phonocean, and they all seem to start with a letter symbolizing the “AY,” or "AH’ sound (i.e. “A,” “ALPHA,” “ALEPH,” etc.)
Is there any particular purpose for every human alphabet to start with a symbol representing this particular sound?
Couldn’t they all start with “oh,” or “ee,” or some other sound?
Couldn’t they all start with a different letter representing a different sound?
Without libertarian free will, how could God have decided on giving this particular sound first place in all the written alphabets on earth (and if I’m wrong about that, please enlighten me)?
If the direction of the will (even the Divine will) is always determined by the greatest desire, wouldn’t the will be totally immobile when faced with two or more equally desirable alternatives?
Come to think of it, I remember Concordant studies on passages in the book of Romans that emphasized the arbitrary nature of some of God’s choices–like choosing to favor Jacob over Esau.
**
And, not only so, but, when, Rebekah also, was with child, of one - Isaac our father, - They, in fact, not being yet born, nor having practised anything good or bad, - in order that the purpose of God by way of election might stand, - not by works but by him that was calling, It was said unto her - The elder, shall serve the younger…**(Romans 9:10-12.)
How would “election” work if God has no libertarian free will?
Why Abraham to be the father of the faithful?
Why Israel to be the chosen nation?
Why the Levant to be the promised land?
Why Jerusalem to be the sacred city?
Why play out the drama of salvation on the third planet of this particular solar system?
Why pick the Syro-Phonocean alphabet to give birth to every other alphabet on earth?
This is what some philosophers call contingency, and how do you explain it if God doesn’t have libertarian free will?
I am hesitant about entering into a philosophical discussion. Paul himself warns “Beware that no one shall be despoiling you through philosophy and empty seduction…” Col. 2.8.
However, I am sympathetic with your struggles, and maybe I have been too dogmatic when it comes to my near complete disdain for philosophy.
Firstly, we can only go so far with our human reasoning. We constrict God, fitting Him into His universe, when in fact the universe is out of Him. All is out of Him, including love itself. God did not even come out of love. God is the reality.
I would say God does not have a free will, since he is constrained by His love, to the same degree we are constrained by His love. As A.E. Knoch remarked “All his attributes appear and withdraw at the beck of love. All serve it, and never goes counter to its commands.”
In referring to Joseph and his brothers you remark “All that served a purpose, and all that’s fine and dandy, but what about all the things in nature and history that seem truly arbitrary, and don’t seem to serve any particular purpose at all? Without something like libertarian free will, how could God make arbitrary choices?”
I would strongly argue that God makes no arbitrary choices, and would suggest that he cuts the yarn once and awhile. What I mean by this, is that not everything needs to causally effect something else, in order for it to not be arbitrary.
Take a cobweb in an abandoned and derelict house. We know this cobweb is out of God, but why would God cause the existence of this cobweb, if it is not going to serve a purpose?
I would simply respond that it is the finished product of a certain causal chain of events leading back to God. The last note of a piece of music, is as much out of the composer as all the rest of his work.
I will be putting on my green sweater shortly. I know this green sweater is out of God, but it seems so arbitrary, and seems to serve no purpose at all. Why would God choose a green sweater? Well, maybe my green sweater, is the finale of a chain of causal events.
Let’s say three sisters started a clothing company, and the sweater I am wearing was their first product out on the market. Maybe their entire success rested upon selling 25 000 green sweaters. Since 25 000 people like me are wearing their product line, they were able to hire 100 new workers, and make a real difference in people’s lives. (Just as an illustration) Maybe my sweater has already served it’s purpose. Does it still need a purpose in order not to be arbitrary. In order for it not to be out of God?
Still, we truly minimize the significance of those things that seem to serve no purpose. What if my particular clothing was to catch the eye, of my future wife? or not catch the eye of a driver late at night, and I get flattened?
What if that cobweb, altered the course of the mosquitoes in that abondened house? Well, cannot mosquitoes on a later occasion alter the course of a person?
It is said, that major historical events have turned on the truly insignificant. Here is a study for sobornost.
Puddy
And love dictated that Earth should rotate on it’s axis in a counter-clockwise direction (but Venus in a clockwise direction)?
Nothing arbitrary about that?
A better example might be the frozen water they recently discovered on Mercury.
What purpose could H2o serve on a planet that can’t possibly support biological life?
Did love put it there, or is it just there for no particular reason (and therefore placed there arbitrarily)?
Did love dictate every known alphabet on earth should begin with a symbol representing the same phonetic sound?
Would some other simple phoneme be less loving?
Do you really deny the existence of all contingency in the universe?
Do you really maintain that the solar system wouldn’t serve God’s loving purpose as well if Venus rotated in a counter-clockwise direction, or if there were no water on Mercury, or if the alphabet began with the letter “o”?
And if any of these things are arbitrary, how could God have chosen things to be the way they are without exercising libertarian free will (even if it is something I admit I can’t define, and don’t understand)?
Hey Michael
It’s just that I am not sure all things need to be more than an effect. Still every example you have given, has just changed the causal events in your life and mine. For instance when you took the time to write
“Do you really maintain that the solar system wouldn’t serve God’s loving purpose as well if Venus rotated in a counter-clockwise direction, or if there were no water on Mercury, or if the alphabet began with the letter “o”?”
This altered your time course for the day. It also altered mine. This ripple effect alone has likely altered the course of history. Yes, this may sound like an extreme statement until we really think about it.
We truly fail to see how the smallest, and most insignificant of details, even in the solar system can have an effect on our lives. The water on Mercury has likely caused some Christians to lose their faith. (As an example)
I’d actually agree with you in some ways Puddy 
. I find philosophy quite difficult, but I see no problem with philosophy as a way of clarifying our human thinking, and discerning between useful and not so useful concepts. However, it does not really provide answers as such to the deepest questions of life’s meaning and purpose.
We certainly do constrict God by fitting him into our attempts at an objective account of his universe. God is not one thing among many things in God’s creation. God is not a thing like the first domino that falls starting the chain reaction in another line of dominos. God is the superabundant source of all creation – beyond any concepts we can derive from created things apart from affirming that the creation is good and testifies somehow to its great Creator. God’s ‘lawfulness’ is an expression of his very nature – but to think of God as being bound by laws of causation as we understand these with our limited understanding strikes me as besides the point.
One difficulty I have in thinking of God in terms of an account drawn from the natural sciences which concentrates purely on the abstraction of tracing causation, is that I don’t see God simply as a first cause standing outside and part from his universe. God is not only Creator but also Sustainer, intimately involved with the universe in a process of continuous creation and re-creation.
Also as a Trinitarian incarnationalist Christian I believe deep down that God became human – and shared in our human subjectivity. So any thinking or feeling I do about determinism and freedom is not going to be predicated on a view of God as a transcendent ego apart from creation in complete control of its lawfulness – which is a bit like the inflated view that some determinist scientists have of themselves IMHO. It’s going to come out of my experience of God as Abba, and intimate. Because of this I’m not going to be too fussed about squaring the circle of objective and subjective accounts of human experience including human choosing – because God in the incarnation has shared this paradox with us in every way.
No one has ever seen God. My knowledge of God’s Trinitarian existence in eternity is based largely on what I perceive of this life being played out in history of the Incarnation. Its’ from my knowledge of Jesus – however partial this is, that I can affirm that God is trustworthy, and not capricious
Something else that is going to influence my view is that – like many Christina’s from the beginning – I do not see human beings as completely depraved because of the Fall. Yes the fall has damaged us, distorted our will and desire, and imposed real constraints and limitations on us. But we are still created in the image of God – we have guarded reason to trust our instincts for truthfulness, goodness and beauty. However our knowledge will always, always be incomplete and we need to be humble and live practically with this instead of striving for complete a ‘gnosis’ that we expect somehow to be contained within our imperfect faculties.
I know you won’t agree with my Trinitarian Christianity – but I hope you can see that I’m not too puffed up by philosophising.
All the best
Dick