Thanks for the update, Michael. I’m sorry to hear that things are still going badly, but I’m glad to hear of some improvements.
What I actually said, although you continued (and still continue) to shift it to something else, is that it’s a category error to consider non-existence to be an improvement of condition for someone who exists: someone cannot be better off, or worse off either, if they cease to exist, because if they cease to exist they would have no continuation of existence to compare with any condition of existence before they ceased existing. They aren’t better off, they aren’t worse off, they aren’t the same off, they don’t exist at all. Nor, by the same principle, can someone’s existence be improved, or degraded, by coming into existence from non-existence: they didn’t exist previously to have a condition of existence that can be improved or degraded by coming into existence.
I actually affirmed on a regular basis that existence is principally better than non-existence. I only denied that the condition of someone in existence can be better or worse off compared to the condition of someone who doesn’t exist, because someone who doesn’t exist doesn’t even have the condition of being “someone” or any other condition of existence, much less consciousness of a comparative improvement or degradation of (the non-existent person’s) existence.
I also affirmed that existent Person A’s condition of existence might be improved or degraded by Person B coming into existence or ceasing to exist. But that still isn’t an improvement or degradation of Person B’s condition of existence by coming or ceasing to exist.
That is why arguments for annihilation which involve annihilation being a mercy for the annihilated, are fallacious: annihilation of Person A might be a mercy for Person B, but it cannot be a mercy for Person A because Person A’s condition of existence cannot be improved by ceasing to exist. By the same principle, nor should someone seek suicide hoping to cease to exist as a way of improving the condition of their existence.
Consequently, if your Mom ceased to exist, then her condition of existence did not improve upon ceasing to exist. Nor does she now exist in a worse condition. Or in the same condition. Or in any condition at all that can be compared to her condition before ceasing to exist. You didn’t do her any favor, because you didn’t improve her condition of existence if she ceased to exist. But neither did you do her a disfavor if she ceased to exist afterward.
If she continues to exist, you might have improved her condition and done her a favor. Or perhaps you made her condition actually worse. But mercy killing is predicated on either the idea that the killing improves the condition of still-existent people (being a mercy on them), and/or that the killed person continues to exist (or perhaps starts to exist again) after death in an improved condition compared to the condition before death.
It is a category error to say that Person X’s condition of existence is better in heaven than the condition of X’s non-existent existence. It is a category error to say that X’s condition of existence in eternal conscious torment is worse than the condition of X’s non-existent existence. Person X does not improve their condition of existence by ceasing to exist. They improve their condition of existence by going to heaven, and degrade their condition of existence by going to hell. It is not a mercy to someone in hell to annihilate them. Improving their condition of existence (by saving them from hell into heaven for example) is a mercy, not eliminating all conditions of their existence.
It is not (necessarily) a category error to say that X’s existence is better than X’s non-existence for various other reasons. But it is, for comparing the existential experience of X between any conditions of a state of existence and the non-experience of non-conditions of non-existence of X.
It’s a fallacy, in the very limited but important sense so noted. God knows perfectly well that Person X’s condition of existence does not improve or degrade by coming into existence from non-existence or by ceasing to exist from existence. You do, too, occasionally, when I spell it out once again! – but you have always gone back quickly afterward to trying to insist that if someone cannot improve their existence by ceasing to exist (and related positions) then that must mean existence is worthless or at best worth no more than non-existence. I doubt this time will be any different, although I wish for your sake it would be.
Yes, but not by being an act of improving the non-existent condition of existence of something that doesn’t yet exist. Because that’s nonsense and impossible. God creates not-God reality as a loving gift of God by God to God; and creates not-God reality in order to actively love that not-God reality, which He then does in various modes, even when the condition of that creature’s existence degrades temporarily as a result of various factors.
By bringing anything into existence, God gives that creation actual (not merely potential) value. (And also potential value, at least from the perspective of the history of the creature. I’m not sure potential value has any meaning from God’s omnipresently real perspective, except perhaps as an ultimately unrealized option for the creature’s existence actualized in another way of value instead.)
What He gives us creatures in actual value, is not however an improvement of our condition of existence compared to our prior non-condition of non-existence. Existence itself is the first actual value for us. Once we exist, then our conditions of existence can improve or degrade in various ways. If we ever cease to exist, our condition of existence cannot improve, or degrade, or even stay the same – because we wouldn’t exist anymore at all. Ceasing to exist would be a reduction of value, but not for us personally after we cease to exist. It would be a reduction of value for those who remain in existence (i.e. God and still-existent creatures).
Only if you’re thanking God for improving your previously non-existent non-condition-of-existence by bringing you into existence. I don’t doubt God accepts the intention of the gratitude anyway, despite the confusion of thought involved. It is otherwise right and morally proper to be thankful to your Creator for creating you.
Whether you should be thankful to God for any and all particular conditions of existence you might be in, is another question. Generally Christians (and many other theists) have understood that ideally we should be thankful to God for any condition we find ourselves in (some things from Paul’s epistles come to mind), but that doesn’t mean it’s at all easy to do so, and it can be functionally impossible for someone in particular conditions. (To give simple and non-contentious example, someone unconscious cannot while unconscious be thankful to God for any conditions of that person, including being thankful for that person’s unconsciousness.)
Now, the other ad/mods have asked me to stop trying to help you, even though we all want you to be helped. And I think they’re right to do so, under the circumstances. So I’m not going to continue with this, here or elsewhere. If you and other people want to talk about it, fine. If you want to complain that non-existent people don’t have conditions of existence that can be improved or degraded or qualitatively judged to be better or worse than other conditions of actual existence, that’s your choice. If you want to keep pretending I’m saying something else because that somehow makes you feel better to blame me for something I have never once claimed or argued, I can’t stop you. (Or I suppose I could, technically, but I won’t.)
But I do want new members who aren’t familiar with the situation, or old members who have forgotten, to be reassured that “someone here” has not in fact argued that existence is no better and no worse than non-existence, and certainly didn’t try to convince you of that – much the contrary. (Or maybe someone else did, but I didn’t, and I’ve never seen you trying to blame anyone else for your existential angst.) Existence has value, and life has value, even in the worst conditions. Ceasing to exist doesn’t improve any condition of one’s own existence. One’s life conditions ought to be improved, but not by suicide: we’re expected to help each other, and to fight for improving ourselves and each other, in this life, as a cooperation of fair-togetherness (righteousness, justice) between people. For the same reason, people shouldn’t try to punish themselves by suiciding. The people who have been helping you and your family (including you in helping your family) are doing the right thing, because you and your family have value, because existence has value and life has value and personal reality has value – thanks to God. Non-existence has no value, so it is better for you and your family to exist than to not exist; consequently, it is also better (generally speaking) for your conditions of existence to improve. It is not always ethically better for your conditions of existence to improve by any or all means, which is one reason why there can be ethical quandries about how best to proceed, and people can make mistaken or even ethically unjust choices about how to improve their or other people’s conditions.