The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Free Will: Its Essential Nature and Implications

Here’s something that seems useful. I don’t think most Arminians today believe what Arminius and Wesley wrote as quoted here though. Still, this seems to be pretty much what I believe – more or less:

warrantedfaith.org/community … iew=unread

Hi Tom

Although I very much dislike labels, I have described myself as a dogmatic Arminian Universalist - meaning I think the salvation of all is assured, despite our genuine freedom to resist the will of God (a freedom I believe is essential for theodicy). For me, the relevant definition of freedom in this context is simply that God does not determine, cause or control our actions - as, despite their compatibilist smoke and mirrors, hard-core Calvinists maintain.

This is not to say that our actions are ‘purely’ volitional. I think it’s quite obvious that our choices are subject to all sorts of internal and external influences - eg genetics, upbringing, environment, conscience, and the thoughts and wills of others - God being one - a very important one - of those others. It may be that for some - perhaps most - of our actions, when all these influencing factors are accounted for there is little or no volition left. Certainly there is no conscious decision about so much of what we do in our lives. This is just one of the reasons why we shouldn’t judge others - for we do not know what their influencing factors are.

So for me, the crucial question is how God can effect the salvation of all without overriding such ‘free will’ as he has endowed us with. I look forward to discussing that with all here. I’m tagging my mate Andrew [tag]WE ARE ALL BROTHERS[/tag] as I know this is a discussion to which he will be able to contribute, being someone who until recently was agnostic about Universalism because of his strong commitment to human freedom.

All the best

Johnny

What an excellent thread! I look forward to it; I need some education in this area.
Somewhere along the way I hope to get some clarity on the following:

-Are we doing anthropology/psychology - that is, something descriptive; or are we doing conceptual analysis? Or both, or something else?
-Is our ‘will’ part of our material ‘stuff’, or is it a ‘spiritual’ substance that dwells in, but is not part of, our bodies? Or an ‘emergent property’?
-At root, is the difference of opinion between those that are anxious to guard the dignity and freedom of man, by attributing to him a godlike property that stands above all circumstances (which entails the ‘no excuse’ stance - no matter what the circumstances, the person could have chosen otherwise), and those who go the total depravity route (though still clinging, oxymoron-like, to the no excuse model).
-Why would anyone hold to either extreme of the spectrum - infinite free will on one end, or complete determinism on the other?
-It does seem to me that there is a spectrum of behavior and a spectrum of ways of explaining it, so I am very interested to see how this all sorts out.

I’m glad Tom is guiding this, and will be taking ‘baby’ steps. There is so much involved in the discussion, from genetics to the ‘Image of God’ - that herding about 10,323 cats would seem like an easier chore. :laughing:

Thank you all for your thoughtful responses. In my present post I shall restrict myself to the first four responses, those of Bob Wilson, Chrisguy, and Cindy (two posts). I say this because jonnyparker has made an extremely important suggestion that I plan to take up later, and DaveB has asked a question that I still need to think about. And, as already indicated, I plan to proceed very slowly here, so I shall try not to cover too much ground too quickly.

Anyway, Cindy wrote:

I think you are absolutely right about that, Cindy, and what is true of the average Arminian in the pew is also true, I believe, of Arminian scholars and libertarian philosophers: they too make varying (and often confusing) claims about the nature of free will, as your link to that warranted faith site also illustrates, so part of our task here is to clarify some of these different claims. For starters, however, it is perhaps enough to know that, according to the Arminians, God created us as free moral agents and has left us free to reject him forever, if that is what we freely choose to do.

Now even as you have rightly pointed to the necessity of sorting our way through varying hypotheses concerning the nature of free will, so Bob Wilson and Chrisguy have drawn our attention to one of the most important of these hypotheses. As Bob Wilson put it, “My first impression is that ‘freedom’ is thought to mean that one is always able to choose contrary to influencing factors that push in a given direction”; and as Chrisguy put it, “The concept of freedom I would propose is this: the agent in question is able, at the particular time he has freedom (which may not be always), to do otherwise.” If I have understood these remarks correctly, the suggestion here seems to be that freedom requires something like a power of contrary choice; that is, it requires a set of alternatives to choose between, each of which is a genuine psychological possibility for the one doing the choosing. So if I did some action A yesterday, perhaps we can say, along with certain libertarians, that I did A freely only if in the exact circumstances in which I did A it was also within my power to refrain from doing A; and it was within my power to refrain from doing A only if it was psychologically possible for me not to do A. Does that, Bob and Chrisguy, seem to capture your suggestions adequately?

Let us, in any case, accept these suggestions for now, since we can always revisit them if the need should later arise. Let us grant, in other words, that the power of contrary choice is an important necessary condition of someone’s acting freely. Even if this should be so, however, most libertarians would concede that such a power is in no way a sufficient condition of someone’s acting freely. Don’t let that philosophical jargon throw you, since the point is really very simple, namely this: A person might do A, have the power to refrain from doing A in those exact same circumstances, and still not do A freely.

Suppose, by way of illustration, that in a moment of delusion a schizophrenic young man, standing in the kitchen with a butcher knife in his hand and having forgotten to take his medication, should suddenly come to believe that his loving mother is a sinister invader from space who has devoured his real mother and is therefore not his real mother at all. Suppose further that the young man’s delusion should create for him a context of alternative possibilities that would not have existed apart from it; it creates, in other words, a context in which he finds it psychologically possible to slash his mother to death as well as psychologically possible to refrain from killing her (after all, other sinister invaders could easily turn him into their next meal as a punishment for killing his mother!). So whichever decision he makes, his irrational deliberation, as chancy as such things can be, could have produced the contrary choice under the same initial conditions. Here, at least, the presence of alternative possibilities seems incompatible with genuine moral freedom precisely because it entails a degree of irrationality that is itself incompatible with such freedom. Would you agree with that? If so, then we do not yet have a complete account of freedom.

Accordingly, here is a further question: If we suppose for now that the power of contrary choice is indeed a necessary condition of acting freely, what further condition might also be required?

Thanks again for these responses.

-Tom

DaveB asked: “Are we doing anthropology/psychology - that is, something descriptive; or are we doing conceptual analysis? Or both, or something else?”

I’m not quite sure how best to answer your question, Dave. In general, we are all free to define our terms in any way we see fit, provided that we make our own usage clear to others. But it is essential that we do make it clear. Free will theists sometimes drive me crazy when they simply announce that they are using the term “freedom” in the libertarian sense without ever providing anything close to a complete account of what such freedom is supposed to be.

In any event, once we have a reasonably complete account before us, we can then ask such questions as: How well does the proffered account accord with ordinary usage? To what extent, if any, does it result in an artificial concept utterly divorced from our common sense view of the world? How theoretically useful is it in helping us to understand such related concepts as that of moral responsibility or that of rationality? But no definition, taken as a stipulation, is true or false; it simply clarifies how a given term is being used in a given context. So my own strategy is typically to accept any proffered account of freedom and then to start examining its implications, in this case its theological implications.

Thanks for all of your questions, including those I have not yet addressed.

-Tom

An awareness of the power of contrary choice is necessary as well. A severely abused child MIGHT have the power of contrary choice - in the arena of doing ‘good’ or doing ‘evil’ (I’m not convinced of that) - but not ‘know it’, and thus follow a path of life that has been narrowed, by her abuse and subsequent perceptions of what is real and possible, to more and more degradation.

Tom, you indeed restated precisely my own impression of a common central definition that I glean from those who emphasize ‘free-will.’ I resonate with your implication that this would not provide sufficient conditions for a ‘freedom’ that we would value. I imagine another desired condition would be ability to rationally recognize the realties entailed in the choices that we face.

I didn’t read the original post until today, and I thought I would be the first respondent. But no, there was at least 6 others before me! People jumped into this discussion pretty fast! It must be an important topic, as indeed I consider it to be of paramount importance with relation to Christianity, or even morality. I am unable to believe in moral responsiblity in the absence of free will

That is precisely the way I define “free will”. But before discussing your statements which immediately follow, I would like to address your first words from the OP:

Arminians and other free will theists typically suppose that, if we are genuinely free in relation to God, then the following rejection hypothesis (RH) is at least possibly true:

(RH) Some persons will, despite God’s best efforts to save them, freely and irrevocably reject God and thus separate themselves from him forever.

First let me say that I believe in the ultimate reconciliation of all people to God, and so I am not merely “a hopeful universalist”. And yet I believe in libertarian free will. I do not see these two positions as contradictory.

While I think that RH is theoretically possible, I don’t see it as practically possible. I would compare it with tossing a thousand coins and asking whether it is possible that everyone of them could turn out to be heads. As unlikely as that would be, it is definitely a possibility. But what if, when they didn’t all turn out to be heads, and one decided to continue tossing them until they did. It is likely that one might toss them for the rest of their lives and never get all heads. But what if they were tossed endlessly by someone until all became heads. Theoretically and conceptually, the coins could be tossed forever without turning up heads. But practically, the time would come when all of the coins turned up heads.

So it is with RH. Theoretically, some would never submit to God throughout eternity. But practically with God continuing to work on them, and possibly the perfected saints as well, the time will come when every last one of them submits to the authority of the Lord.

Dr. Talbott, the description of free-will actions which you so clearly stated is precisely how I see free will:

It is my belief that my abililty to have chosen contrary to the choice I actually made is both a necessary and sufficient condition of my acting freely. Indeed, this condition is what DEFINES “acting freely.” This would not be the case, only if “acting freely” is understood differently, and if “acting freely” is understood differently, then exactly how is it understood?

That would mean that “doing A freely” has a different connotation.

As I see it, your illustration may not fit the case, since the young man is delusional. In my opinion, mentally ill people, or brain damaged people, or people of a very low level of awareness, in some cases, do not have free will. But ordinary persons without such a condition—those whom we regard as “normal” do.

Is the discussion about free will in general, or is the focus on our free will before God? Is it the moral aspect that is the concern here only? And if so, how legitimate is it to bifurcate a person’s will? I would argue, I think, that everyday will and a special aspect of it are really talking about the “same” thing.

If, as Paidion points out, we limit ourselves to ‘normal’ people - and I see the point he’s making - it will be tempting to explain one difficult concept - free will - by another - ‘normal’. If as traditionally taught, we are a fallen race, then normal is what we are not; some of us just fit in better with the crowd, are more ‘normal’.

Is the ‘will’ of the libertarians a different ‘will’ than humans exercise on a normal basis?

I think I agree with several of the things already said, but to draw them together . . . In order for an action to be freely taken, it seems to me that the actor must understand the implications of his action. For example, if he, intending only to start his car and drive to the corner drugstore, unwittingly sets off a car bomb that kills him, we couldn’t reasonably say that he has committed suicide even though he acted freely in turning the key. No, not even if he had been warned and had not believed the warning. If a sinner who doesn’t understand the truth of the gospel for one reason or another, whether he’s heard it and not believed, or heard it amiss, or has never heard it, refuses or fails to accept the salvation of Christ and repent from his sin, can we fairly say that he’s acted freely? Had he been able to take advantage of all the information that is available (for example) to you or me, would he have acted differently?

Furthermore, if he is delusional or irrational for any other reason – if he is organically or emotionally or otherwise unable to act as he would act were he possessed of normal human faculties, can we say he’s acting freely in choosing or failing to choose any action at all? I do think that sanity and reasonable disclosure of information is necessary in order for a person to act freely. In addition, I might also petition for a certain degree of maturity as a prerequisite to being able to make use of information and sane thought.

Maybe there are other things as well, but I can’t think of any at the moment.

Looking forward to hearing more from all the others as well. :slight_smile:

Paidion wrote:

That seems to me exactly right, Paidion. So if someone suffering from an irrational delusion, or from severe mental illness, or from serious brain damage should do A in a context where it remains psychologically possible for this person to refrain from A, such a person would not, I take it, do A freely, despite having the power of contrary choice. Are not you and I in perfect agreement on this matter?

Bob Wilson seems to agree with us as well. For Bob wrote:

And so does Cindy, who wrote:

Wonderful discussion! :smiley:

The idea of a fully informed decision to reject God eternally brings to mind the concept of “informed consent” that we use in the medical field before performing a “healthcare intervention”–usually an invasive procedure or operation. Here’s part of the wiki entry:

The main difference, I think, between “informed consent” and a “fully informed decision” (at least as I see it) is the degree of certainty in the consequences. When informing patients about a possible procedure or treatment, we are dealing with possibilities with a certain statistical likelihood of happening whether these possibilities involve a “good” result or a “bad” one. The patient is asked to make a decision without knowing what the actual outcome of their decision would be. If for example, they knew for certain the planned by-pass surgery would result in a major stroke or death, they would be insane to elect to make a decision to undergo the surgery. If they* only* know that the odds of a good outcome are, say, 85% and a bad outcome 15%, a decision to undergo surgery would seem to be reasonable. Additionally,(and perhaps most important :wink: ) to be fully informed, the patient would need to know exactly what the experience of having a major stroke or, in fact, dying would be like for them.

Edit: I said

I should add that they would need to know what the implications of them “having a major stroke or dying” would be for others—especially those they love.

Great example with the consent form, Steve. I’ve often thought it inadequate since many patients sign it under extreme duress – that is to say, if I DON’T do this, it can have serious consequences for me, but if I DO submit to the surgery/procedure, it could kill me faster or incapacitate me worse than the disease/injury it’s meant to treat. They act in fear which seems to me to be a significant impediment to rational thought. :frowning: Still, it’s probably the best we can do. But it is NOT the best God can do. That is perhaps an argument against threatening people with hell in order to obtain a conversion to the God who (reputedly) will impose hell upon them if they decline to convert. But that’s probably another topic.

Anyway, my point is – I think we need a greater degree (at least on a human level) of competence and knowledge in order to choose our final destiny (the Kingdom of God or (reputedly) never-ending hellfire) than we can give to patients who sign a consent for treatment. Father gives some of us the faith to believe without seeing, and that’s a great blessing. Others like Thomas, and I suspect some of the other disciples as well, need to see before they can believe. God does not therefore damn them. He meets their need.

I have an opinion about this, but I barely know how to put it into words-- I’ll try my best, but perhaps you all here can help me figure out what I’m trying to say. :wink:

John 8:36 says, “So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed.” I wonder, then, if it is possible for anyone to make a free choice–whether for or against God–before coming to Christ. It seems free will comes only after entering Christ’s presence (thus receiving full information of God’s goodness.) Free will must come after knowledge. I remember as a child, I decided one day to grasp my mother’s hot curling iron. Obviously, it burnt my hand. Before that point, I did not have the “free” will to decide whether or not I should grasp the hot metal-- I had a “will” or sorts, but it was marred by my ignorance. Only after experience had opened my eyes did I have fully “free” will to touch or avoid the curling iron.

So Christ sets us free through His very presence. In knowing him, we have no reason to refuse God’s gifts anymore and thereby will naturally make a decision to accept Him. Since Christ clarifies in John 12:32 that he will draw all people to Himself, then we can only assume that all humanity will one day gain full information about God and ultimately make a fully informed decision toward the only logical choice of accepting His love.

I think that when God tears down all the barriers of our ignorance, shame, doubt, and sin, everyone’s core nature can do nothing but accept the Savior of the World. Following this logic, coming to Christ is both a free choice and an inevitable action for all of humanity.

I think that when God tears down all the barriers of our ignorance, shame, doubt, and sin, everyone’s core nature can do nothing but accept the Savior of the World. Following this logic, coming to Christ is both a free choice and an inevitable action for all of humanity.

You may be right Kate. Paul’s paradigm changed in less then a minute once he saw Christ.

This is a good point and essential to understanding our freedom. It seems that there is a necessarily rational component, if not to freedom per se, at least with the type of freedom an all-good God would grant or ultimately give his creatures. (For a freedom which only included exercising actions the consequences of which were unpredictable or in a context which was not truly reflective of reality would be a curse, not a gift, and would only be given by an evil being.)

Yet I do think freedom is real, and that we are in truth actually in situations like the schizophrenic described above. The question then becomes this. For what purpose is this type of freedom, which seems so different than a “pure” freedom which makes it, as Lewis says, “not really possible to do otherwise” - for what reason is this different kind of freedom given to us? I suspect it has something to do with the making of our individuality and separateness from God, a necessary condition for our ultimate unity with him. Does this make sin inevitable? Can it be that sin (and therefore death?) is a free yet nevertheless unavoidable consequence of being a separate being from God, exercising an independence and existence of one’s own?

Also of interest are some other thoughts of Lewis on freedom.

"I would say that the most deeply compelled action is also the freest action. By that I mean, no part of you is outside the action. It is a paradox. I expressed it in Surprised by Joy by saying that I chose, yet it really did not seem possible to do the opposite.”

He said the above in his “last” interview.

“All that Calvinist question - Free Will and Predestination, is to my mind undiscussable, insoluble. Of course (say us) if a man repents God will accept him. Ah yes, (say they) but the fact of his repenting show that God has already moved him to do so. This at any rate leaves us with the fact that in any concrete case the question never arrives as a practical one. But I suspect it is really a meaningless question. The difference between Freedom and Necessity is fairly clear on the bodily level: we know the difference between making our teeth chatter on purpose and just finding them chattering with col. It begins to be less clear when we talk of human love (leaving out the erotic kind.) “Do I like him because I choose or because I must?” - there are cases where this has an answer, but others where it seems to me to mean nothing. When we carry it up to relations between God and Man, has the distinction perhaps become nonsensical? After all, when we are most free, it is only with a freedom God has given us: and when our will is most influenced by Grace, it is still our will. And if what our will does is not “voluntary” and if “voluntary” does not mean “free” what are we talking about?”

Letters Vol. 3.

“The whole struggle was over, and yet there seemed to have been no moment of victory. You might say, if you liked, that the power of choice had been simply set aside and an inflexible destiny substituted for it. On the other hand, you might say he had been delivered from the rhetoric of his passions and had emerged in unassailable freedom. Ransom could not for the life of him, see any difference between these two statements. Predestination and freedom were apparently identical. He could no longer see any meaning in the many arguments he had heart on the subject.”

Perelandra

Also, a quick question for Dr. Talbott.

Do you plan on including the Lewis quotes on freedom (e.g. about his own conversion, etc.) in the update to Inescapable Love of God? They would be a delightful and helpful addition!

Chrisguy asked:

Yes, I include these and other quotes from Lewis in a new Chapter entitled “Predestination unto Glory.” I divide this chapter into the following five sections: “Hopeful Versus Necessary Universalism” (where I put myself in the latter camp); “The Essential Role of Free Will in Universal Reconciliation”; “God’s Respect for Human Freedom”; “Freedom, Necessity, and the Right Kind of Compulsion”; and “Concerning the Purpose of an Earthly Life.”

But I’m inclined to disagree with Lewis when he says: “"All that Calvinist question - Free Will and Predestination, is to my mind undiscussable, insoluble.” I also disagree with his implication that we are here dealing with a paradox. For as I see it, such remarks give far too much credence to Calvinist theology and, in addition, threaten to undermine Lewis’ own response to the problem of evil. Beyond that, St. Paul’s pre-philosophical understanding of God’s all-pervasive grace provides a perfectly clear picture, I contend, of how free will, indeterminism, and even sheer chance, if you will, might fit into a predestinarian scheme in which a glorious end is guaranteed for all of us. For God simply has no need to control our specific choices or to bypass our own reasoning processes in order to checkmate each one of us in the end.

Those are extremely important quotations, however, and I am ever so grateful to you for having shared them with us.

-Tom