The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Trinitarian Theology and Universalism

I understand that for some trinitarian theology has led to a belief in universal reconciliation. I am just wondering for both trinitarians and no-trinitarians, to what extent has your (non)trinitarianism supported your belief in universal reconciliation, if at all?

I think the Trinity supports EU because I think it allows God the Father to have always loved others, i.e. God the Son & God the Spirit. Having other focused love as a core thing about God means it’s not surprising to find He created out of love for others & wants to redeem/restore because of love for others.

Before Jason swamps us :wink: I recommend reading evangelicaluniversalist.com/foru … =10&t=1939

Also, there’s that huge 870ish page book listed in my sig. :wink:

I’ve also got a formal argument around here somewhere (probably in the philosophical section), from trinitarian theism to universalism, and from hope of salvation to trinitarian theism (kind of the same thing the other way around).

Okay, Jason has already had a brief start. So before he swamps us, I would like to declare that my non-Trinitarianism also makes the same allowance concerning God’s eternal love. What follows constitutes my beliefs about this:

Since the Son of God was begotten at the beginning of time (or “begotten of the Father before all ages” as the early Christians believed and the original Nicene creed affirmed), there never was a time when He did not exist, and thus there never was a time when the Father existed alone.

As for the holy spirit, I regard the spirit of God as personal, but not a person—rather the persons of the Father and of the Son who reside in heaven is some special way, but who extend their spirit throughout the universe, but especially into the minds and hearts of Christ’s disciples.

So would you agree, Alex, that the existence of the Father and the Son from the beginning of time as espoused by this non-Trinitarian implies that mutual love always existed?

Insofar as the Father transcends all space-time and acts toward loving at least one creature in at least one space-time (even if that creature utterly ceased to exist a moment of space-time after loving God) who loved God back, mutual love between God the Father and some other person could be said to always exist. One doesn’t even need your bi-theism theology for that; I’m willing to acknowledge that even to mere monotheists of no Christianity whatsoever.

(Although “begotten of the Father before all ages” goes farther back than “at the beginning of time”, thus ontologically farther back.)

Trinitarian (or even binitarian) theism involves mutual love at a more fundamental level than the mere act of loving some entity at some point (or even ontologically ‘before’ all points) of any space-time, though: the ultimate deity of God (on either theory, binitarian or trinitarian) constantly self-exists by the act of God self-begetting loving God self-begotten loyally submitting to God self-begetting; and consequently all not-God reality depends on that mutual love, too.

Even bi-theism (of two utterly distinct entities) doesn’t involve that. Bi-theism does however involve all the serious ontological problems of cosmological dualism, in that both entities must thus exist within, not as, a common single overarching system of reality – that system being the real God if actively rational itself, or atheism otherwise. On a proposal of bi-theism, we aren’t talking about the real God Most High yet, only two subordinate creatures, although if atheism is true they would by proposal be the two most merely powerful rational actors in existence.

That’s fair enough, since the Spirit of God is regarded as both the Spirit of the Son and the Spirit of the Father. I know at least one Eastern Orthodox theologian, Bulgakov, leaned heavily on a similar notion beyond the orthodox 3rd Person, too, a personal divinity that was not a personal deity, generated as a sort of exudence of the Trinity.

Myself, I’m not much fond of concepts of something as personal-but-not-a-person(al), but your version seems to involve the persons giving themselves but not some third distinct person throughout the universe, so at least the Father is giving the Son (a personal person) and the Son is giving the Father (a personal person).

There would however be less than no point for any author, or for Jesus, to speak of the Holy Spirit in a list with the Father and the Son, especially including doxologies, if that was true – otherwise you’d be talking about Them giving a personal person Who wasn’t specifically Themselves. Which is what trinitarian theism involves, if the third Person is also the one and only God Most High, each of the actively self-begetting/self-begotten Persons giving the gift of God Most High to each other and to created persons as the next ontological action distinct from fundamental aseity: the third Person proceeds from the Father and the Son but isn’t the self-begetting or self-begotten Person. After that, no further distinction of Persons within the unity of singular deity seems conceivable; for more persons to exist God must create not-God systems of reality.

(Binitarian theism on the other hand could involve the two Persons of the one substantial independent fact of all reality giving a created person as a spirit; in that case the Holy Spirit would hold much the same position as the high Arian ultra-angelic person of the Son, aside from the distinctions of person of course: the Spirit would be the first and greatest created not-God person. Bi-theism could involve the two substantially similar but not identical most-poweful entities creating and giving a third personal spiritual entity not substantially similar to themselves–although since you deny the Spirit is an actual person that couldn’t be what you’re talking about–but all three persons would exist within a common overarching ultimate system of reality, not as the one single foundational common overarching system of reality, so all three would be created or evolved or whatever, none of them actually being ontologically God Most High.)

Be all that as it may – obviously there are bunches of theological options, some of them subtly though distinctly different from each other. :slight_smile:

The more salient question in regard to Sazag84’s original post, is to what extent has your non-trinitarianism supported your belief in universal reconciliation, if at all, Paidion? (Or any other non-trinitarian.) I’m on record of coming to universalism from working out the implications of trinitarian theism. I might still be a Christian universalist for other reasons–I don’t claim Christian universalism is impossible apart from trinitarian theism. But I do continue to maintain that the two concepts are uniquely related to one another such that universalism logically follows as a corollary from and only from trinitarian theism.

I acknowledge that Christian theism might still be true if a different Christian theism is true; what I mean is that Christian universalism wouldn’t and could not logically follow from another theism to the same fundamental degree as from trinitarian theism–precisely because only trinitarian theism can and does involve the fulfillment of supportive interpersonal relationships at and as the ultimate fundamental level of all reality: the overarching independent fact of reality is the action to fulfill interpersonal relationships. God doesn’t only love, God ontologically is love, and the fulfillment of God’s love is justice/righteousness. There are not two justices, the justice the Persons of God give each other in order for God (and everything else) to exist at all and the justice the Persons give to not-God creatures; but instead one justice, onerighteousness, the standard of all relationships less than the ontological aseity of God.

I grant God might still decide to always act toward fulfilling all fair-togetherness between persons (from person to person and from person to Person) if trinitarian theism isn’t true, without which decision there could be no universal salvation from non-fair-togetherness, from injustice, from sin (thus no Christian universalism). It isn’t logically impossible that such a lesser God Most High (so to speak) could do so. But if trinitarian theism is true, it is absolutely certain with a uniquely fundamental certainty that God does act and has acted and always will act to do so.

That’s the extent my trinitarianism supports my belief in universal reconciliation. I can still imagine being a Christian universalist if some lesser ultimate theism is true instead, and I can even imagine being logically sure insofar as the grounds of that theism allow. I can even (sort of) imagine the grounds of that theism allowing logical certainty of a sort.

But not of that sort, not that fundamentally. The difference in category is the difference between trinitarian theism and anything less than trinitarianism.

I should add that I certainly sympathize with the difficulties of believing trinitarian (or even binitarian) theism compared to some other kind of theism: I wouldn’t want anyone to believe trinitarian theism to be true unless and until they can see sufficient reason to believe it; and lacking such sufficient reason, it would be better to believe some other kind of theism instead.

Similarly I wouldn’t want someone to believe it in order to get the epistemic assurance of universal salvation that follows if it’s true (since that assurance would be false if trinitarianism isn’t true!–and since that is no good reason in itself to believe trinitarian theism.)

And relatedly, I wouldn’t want someone’s belief in Christian universalism undermined by not being able to accept trinitarian theism: there are other reasons to believe CU is true, and it is certainly much better to trust God to save sinners from sin than not to trust Him to do so, regardless of theologies! Persons should believe as much as they see clear to do so, looking for more light thereby. :slight_smile:

I read your post, but as far as a rational reply is concerned, this is as far as I got. For I cannot make any sense out of the statement, “The Father transcends all space-time.” Indeed, I can make no sense of the concept “outside of time” since my understanding of time itself is not that of some ethereal entity which needed creating, but simply a measurement of the temporal distance between events. Thus “the existence” of time follows as logically from the passage of the first events as as the creation of an equi-angular triangle follows logically from the creation of an equilateral triangle. So how could there be any events “outside of time”?

Similarly with space. Like time, space is not an entity which requires creating, but is a measurement of the distance between objects. No objects implies no space. So “the existence of space” follows logically from the creation of matter.

So I do not understand the concept of either events or entities transcending space-time, and it is my opinion that I OUGHT NOT to understand the concept. For it is my belief that it is not a rational concept.

That’s why I qualified it as “all space-time”: it involves measurement of temporal distance between events in a derivative system of reality, a reality substantially not-God depending for its existence upon God.

If God is natural space-time, then pantheism is true. If instead our natural space-time depends (directly or indirectly by a medium) on an ultimately fundamental reality which is not itself, then either that reality behaves independently of space-time (by generating space-time for example) or it does not. If it does not, then neither could it ontologically generate natural space-time; if it does, then either it behaves rationally (in an intentionally active fashion) or non-rationally (in a merely automatic fashion)–the former would be supernaturalistic theism, the latter would be supernaturalistic atheism, but either way there would be events outside our created spatio-temporal system of reality. If the ultimate independent fact also exists in active self-generation (self-begetting and self-begotten), then once again there are events outside our created spatio-temporal system of reality.

The system has characteristics, such as multiple objects existing in distance (and temporal) relationships with each other, and either that system requires creating by something substantially different from itself, or the system exists independently (and in the long run there can only be one independent system of existence upon which any other substantially different system of existence, if any exists, must be dependent for existence.) If our spatio-temporal system requires creating, then some kind of supernaturalism is true (although it might be supernaturalistic atheism); if it does not, then some kind of philosophical naturalism is true (whether that’s naturalistic theism or naturalistic atheism).

Now, if you don’t believe events can occur independently of the behaviors and characteristics of the evident system of space-time we exist in, then as a logical corollary you will have to deny any kind of supernaturalism (in this sense of the term) and only affirm some kind of naturalism; and if you do not regard our system of space-time as being intentionally, rationally active, but rather as being automatically reactive and counter-reactive (it never makes choices in its behavior, only ping-pongs around automatically in its systemic behaviors), then you will be in the category of naturalistic atheism, although you could still believe in multiple most-powerful-creatures (one begetting another like itself) existing within our ultimately atheistic reality. But then we aren’t talking at all about the same kind of God Most High qualitatively, and our differences run much deeper than whether bi-theism or binitarian (or trinitarian) theism is true.

On the other hand, if you regard our system of space-time as being intentionally, rationally active, but still don’t believe events can occur independently of this system, then what you are proposing will be naturalistic theism, i.e. pantheism. In which case when you propose that God begets another God substantially like Himself (one the Father and one the Son), this must be within the naturalistic pantheism (since the system could not beget another like itself, much less have another separate system exist apart from itself, as both systems would then exist within a third overarching and substantially different system on which they would depend for existence) and so one way or another you aren’t really talking God Most High yet, but about two lesser gods existing within the natural God (the God Who is our evident system of spatio-temporal Nature.)

If you’re talking about two separate theistic Natures, one begotten by the other, one (whether the Father or the Son) being our evident system of space-time relationships, then both still exist in a third overarching reality substantially different from themselves (by being independent of existence instead of dependent on something else for existence), and you’re still not talking about God Most High yet. Or if you are, then the most high god and his son both exist in an atheistic reality.

If you’re talking about two separate theistic entities, one begotten by the other, neither one being our evident system of space-time relationships (but upon one or both of whom our space-time system depends for existence), then you’re talking about events existing outside space-time, but still not yet about God Most High upon Whom those two theistic entities must depend for their own shared existence. Or else the most high god and his son both exist in an ultimately atheistic reality, even though one or both of them created this spatio-temporal system of Nature.

If you’re talking about two distinct persons, one begotten by the other, who don’t exist within a common shared reality, but exist as the one single common foundation of all reality, by Whom and by which our spatio-temporal system of Nature depends for existence, then you’re actually talking about binitarian theism (as a type of supernaturalistic theism), and we’re much closer together on theology than otherwise. But you’re also talking about events outside the existence of natural space-time.

(Stonehouse, for example, was an early 19th or late 18th century binitarian Christian universalist. The only one I myself ever heard of; in fact the only binitarian Christian theist I’ve ever personally heard of, unless you happen to be one without realizing it.)

The salient point for this thread however is that out of all those options, only binitarian (or trinitarian) theism involves a continuously acted fulfillment of fair-togetherness between persons as the one and only single foundational reality upon which all reality other than itself depends.

And that makes a unique and huge conceptual difference as to how we ought to logically expect such an interpersonal God to behave in regard to the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of mutually supporting personal relationships. (I could say in regard to any other personal relationships at all, for when persons abuse one another in their relationships they behave as though the relationships are not personal or not relationships.)

A binitarian (or trinitarian) God must act to fulfill righteousness between persons, or else be acting against such a God’s own foundational reality. There can be temporary side jaunts, so to speak, but the end goal must be fulfilling righteousness between persons; not between only some persons but between all persons.

And that means always acting toward saving sinners from sin, until it’s done.

And that’s technically universalism, not anything else.

Another kind of God might act toward the same goal, but not for such fundamental ontological reasons. A non-bi/trinitarian God could act instead toward a different goal without ceasing to exist (along with all other reality), and so implement eternal conscious torment of sinners or annihilation of sinners. Metaphysically, a bi-or-trinitarian God could not do so and remain in existence.

Similarly when we act against fulfilling fair-togetherness between persons, we’re acting against the source of our own existence Who (if bi/trinitarianism is true) is an active interpersonal relationship as the one and only single eternal ground of all reality. The only reason we don’t poof out of existence, annihilated as persons, when we do that, is because God keeps us in existence as persons (one way or another); but if bi/trinitarian theism is true, God does this in ontological coherency with God’s own active ongoing self-existence. If bi-or-trinitarian theism is true, we can be logically sure as a corollary that God does not annihilate sinners; nor that God ever gives up acting toward saving sinners from sin; nor that God ever chooses never to even try saving sinners from sin.

(Keeping in mind, I’m having to summarize something like 700 pages of analysis there. :wink: )

All I can do is give a summary of my theology:

A. I am neither Trinitarian nor Binitarian.
B. I believe the following propositions:

  1. God begat His only-begotten Son, and this together with the next event resulted in time (temporal distance between these two events).
  2. The Son was not created as the creatures were created, but begotten.
  3. For this reason the Son is fully divine—just as divine as the Father.
  4. The concept of “outside of time” is meaningless.
  5. The Father is causally prior to the Son, but not temporally prior.
  6. The Father and the Son transcend the creation, and thus pantheism is false.
  7. It is not that God IS space-time. Nor did He create space-time. Rather space-time resulted from the first events and the creation of matter.
  8. The begetting of the Son was not “within nature”, but within time. Matter (and thus “nature” did not exist until God created it through His Son.
    9.Space was not “generated”. When the first matter existed, space was the consequent (the distance between particles of matter). Likewise, time was not “generated.” Time was the consequence of the occurence of events.
  9. The Father and the Son ARE two distinct persons, but are hamoniously one, in sharing the same intentions, purposes, Love, and every other divine characteristic. The Son is the exact stamp of the Fathers essence (Heb 1:3)
  10. Jesus indicated by His whole life that He was a divine Individual distinct from His Father. He said, “Not my will but Yours be done,” indicating the possibility that His will would differ from that of the Father if He did not always yield it to the Father. He again indicated this by saying, “If it is possible, let this cup (of suffering) pass from me.”

I believe that all of the above statements are individually coherent and collectively consistent. If you think otherwise, please indicate CLEARLY why you think this is the case.