The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Tentative answer to the problem of evil

I’ve always thought that if you couldn’t answer a question simply and shortly, you really didn’t have a good answer. I believe this to be the case with theology as much as anything else. So, to get to the point, here is my tentative answer to the problem of evil:

If evil did not exist, how could the universe overcome it?

A universe with some evil in it and in which that evil is overcome may be better than one in which there was no evil at all and one in which there was evil but in which it was never overcome. A universe with evil is MORE FREE than one which doesn’t have evil, in the sense that it has the ability to do acts an evil-less universe would not.

I’ve never argued God created evil. Evil is an immoral act. God cannot be immoral, hence, he cannot do evil.

I have argued that God either causes pain or permits it. In either case, he wills its existence, and this for a higher good. I do not believe it is just “one” higher good. Rather, many different goods exist because pain exists and therefore justifies, in my opinion, its existence. Some are:

a) The opportunity to be free enough to make certain choices which would be impossible unless pain were present
b) The contrastive good that is afforded by being delivered from pain which would otherwise be impossible to experience
c) The understanding/knowledge that is gained by either suffering for another out of love, or having another suffer for you out of love - such a knowledge and expression of love would not be possible unless pain existed.

I do not claim that ALL good must need involve pain somehow. There are certainly choices that do not require pain to be enjoyed, and goods which do not require contrast to be enjoyed, and knowledge of love that does not require pain to be understood/appreciate. Nevertheless, the goods outlined above are possible goods that would not be present in the universe if pain did not exist.

Indeed, I am not even saying that evil must “necessarily” exist. I’m not sure it is coherent to say that anything in God’s creation “must” exist - as if I must exist or this planet. Things dependent on God’s will, if he is free, do not necessarily exist. It’s sort of like saying “why didn’t God create x universe instead of y?” Well what does it matter, so long as what he made is as good as it can be? Aquinas thought that God could always make better than he did make - for every world he made, he could make another better one - but what he did in fact make, he made as perfect as he could. Perhaps it is then incoherent to talk about things being “necessary” or not. What I am saying is that perhaps the above goods are such that JUSTIFY God’s permitting evil - not that they show how evil is “necessary.”

In what sense might it be better?

Chrisguy90 said:-

Scripturally Evil is painted as a temporary aberrant state that will be overcome, but as for it having been some type of necessity I have an issue with that. I know it is a common thought but as with the concept of dark having to exist in order to appreciate light IMO the argument is fallacious; if light existed everywhere there would be no darkness neither would darkness be necessary to appreciate the light. Darkness may serve to appreciate the light because of its contrast but that is not the same as necessity.

S

There’s no problem. God created evil for a purpose. He uses it righteously, but you are right. We need it to be tested and overcome. But the evil is within us. It is our carnal natures.

If we are even going to begin to offer an answer for the traditional “Problem of Evil”, we must first recognize that of which the problem consists. It’s not just the fact that evil exists in the world. It’s the fact that God “allows” it (in the sense of seldom if ever doing anything to prevent it).

1.The heinous atrocites which have occured every day from time immemorial such as the rape and torture of women and children, as well as the mental and emotional abuse of the same.

2.“Natural” causes of suffering and death, such as earthquakes, floods, attacks by animals, etc.

The problem of evil has been used as an argument against an omnipotent, omnicient, and omni-agapic God. The syllogism goes like this:

Premises:

  1. If God is aware of all the evil in the world, and is all-powerful, then He has the ability to prevent it.
  2. If God is all-loving, then He would want to prevent it.
  3. Evil continues to exist in the world.

Conclusion:
Either God is not all-knowing, or He is not all-powerful, or He is not all-loving, or some combination of these.

So I would deny premise 2. He would not want to prevent it, absolutely speaking. The question then becomes what moral reason does he have for permitting it? If he is justified, and if his reason is consistent with a being of total love, then the conclusion would not follow. (Actually, if you think God always acts with perfect motives, you could deny premise 1 as well by saying he doesn’t have the ability to do less than the perfect job that he does in creation. It would be like asking whether God had the power to send deny himself, or of sending his entire universe to Hell, or allowing himself to stop being God.) So one could say that preventing all the evil in the world is a logical impossibility for a being which requires evil in order to bring about the best purposes of his creation.

Now, would he be justified in allowing evil in order to create beings which are free, in the sense that they have the unique ability to perform acts otherwise impossible - i.e. overcoming temptation, defying hopelessness, committing acts of unselfish generosity? Unless evil were present - unless one actually was tempted, did feel hopeless, etc. - such acts would be impossible. Unless evil is experienced by the beings, it is not clear that they have the ability to make certain kinds of free choices.

What do you think?

Perhaps a creature who has the ability to fight off anger, to deny lust, to overcome an unfair scandal, is a better/more valuable being than a creature who never experienced these evils. Perhaps the first kind of beings are more free than the second, in that they have the ability to do acts the second do not?

I do somewhat empathize with the idea of “contrast,” though I think some people certainly use it as a be all, end all response (erroneously) and show no understanding of what you’re saying. I do not have to eat mud to appreciate a piece of pie, neither do I have to have witnessed a grotesquely ugly human to appreciate a beautiful one. Of course, CERTAIN goods are only appreciable through contrast, such as “salvation.” But I agree with you that not ALL good need be mixed with evil to be contrasted and appreciated. Such a response to the problem of evil is not the sort of metaphysical clencher that some believe it is.

As for what you said about necessity - if evil is not in some sense necessary to the good of creation, how is it not superfluous? And how therefore does this not imply that God created more evil than he had to? Would that not make him in some sense either evil or a failure, or, in other words, less than “God”?

You seem to be saying much the same thing as your original statement (quoted above). So I ask, why would a creature able to overcome evil, be any better or more valuable than one who had never experienced these evils? For the latter would not need such abilities in his universe that had no evil at all in it.

More free to do what? Fight off evil? But that freedom would be unnecessary in a universe without evil. Surely the people in the latter universe could have all the freedom that was necessary for them.

Here is a passage to consider:

  • The Lord is … not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance. (2Peter 3:9)*

Would you say that absolutely speaking, God DOES want some people to perish? For the fact is that presently some do.

I’m not arguing that the creature would need such abilities in his own universe, rather that, were he in such a universe, he would objectively lack such abilities. Perhaps performing such abilities provides a way in which to enjoy the good of existence that would otherwise be impossible.

Also, perhaps both types of beings could (and do) exist. Maybe God has made whole galaxies of beings that have never experienced evil. That wouldn’t make him unjustified in him not making us like them, do you think? It seems reasonable to me that he could make both types of creatures and be morally justified.

Chris said:-

I might argue that a) God did not create evil, evil is not an entity but the ultimate manifestation of a Life without the Source - God. b) one might argue the necessity for the possibility of Evil (for the sake of free will); the choice of attempted existence without the Benevolent Creator. But that again is different from the necessity of evil.

I’m perhaps sounding old fashioned but if Angelic beings exist in the traditional understanding then these exist (the Unfallen ones) without having experienced evil within themselves, observing evil perhaps but not being evil of themselves and if this is the case then the implication would be that evil is not something that of necessity has to exist.
Cheers S

I won’t repeat the arguments I posted on another thread, chrisguy, since you know my position already :slight_smile: Just to point out that I don’t find your theodicy working for me. I fail to see how making God the originator of evil makes the situation better - I think I’d rather go with almost any alternative than a God who creates evil.

One of the definitions of nachash–serpent is “to learn by experience”

Once we took the fruit of the tokogae (the tree of the serpent IMO) our eyes were opened and we had become like Elohim. We are being made into His image and being able to discern between good and evil is a part of that growth. We can’t very well be running our own universes as untested babes oe we might be the evil god and ect become a reality. :ugeek:

I’m trying very hard not to see this post as disingenuous.

I understood you to say, in the other thread, that you were “backing off” any sort of intellectual attempt to converse with me about the problem of evil and our varying attempts at solving it. I posted many specific questions and difficulties I saw with your resolution, as well as answered some of your objections (such as the one you post above regarding God “creating evil” - a strawman.) Instead of engaging me, you refrained. That is understandable. But why would you post something like the above? There is nothing in the attempt at answering or engaging my points, just a mere wave of the hand in dismissal. I spent a lot of time answering you and thinking about what you said to me in the other thread. If you do not find what I say convincing, it is at least courteous and intellectually decent to explain why in a way that doesn’t caricature my views.

I’ll repeat to you the problems I find in your view, and, if you’d like to rebut or answer them, feel free. But to leave the problems unmet, and then to say offhandedly that you find what I say uncompelling and give no reason why, is just plain irresponsible thinking and bad argument.

  • To suppose that God can have a probabilistic knowledge of future events and at the same time be totally ignorant of free willed choices until they occur is to me incoherent.
  • To say that God does not will evil at all or in an absolute sense is to me patently false, for he either willed the allowance of evil which he positively foresaw, or he willed its possibility. In either case, he ultimately willed that evil should exist in the universe.
  • To say that free will is in itself the greater good that allows the permission of evil is to contradict your initial point that God does not will evil in an absolute sense, and also to posit a value (freedom) in itself or by itself alone that is not deemed by the universal witness of human conscience as high a value as you say it is to God. Also, there are insuperable difficulties in saying that free will alone is the reason why evil occurs, given that most evil that occurs simultaneously prevents another person from exercising their so highly valued free will. Free will may play a part in the allowance of evil, but you have not explored why this is so in any developed degree. On the other hand, I am trying to show in this thread that evil provides a context in which certain free willed choices can be made that would otherwise be impossible. Hence, it is not the mere fact that people are ABLE to do evil which is why evil occurs, rather, evil (or rather pain in some form) provides opportunities to express deeper actions (bravery, love, etc.) which would not otherwise be possible. I am MORE FREE to show my brother how much I care for him by jumping in front of a bullet for him. Without such risk - which itself would not be intelligible unless we experienced pain in some form - it is not clear I could ever express such a deep love. But the PAIN ITSELF does not necessarily come from any of my free acts.
  • To claim that all natural evil is the result of spirits is, to me, prima facie false.

I am trying to SOLVE and OFFER SOLUTIONS to the problem of evil. I’m not sure you really are.

I’ve never argued God created evil. Evil is an immoral act. God cannot be immoral, hence, he cannot do evil.

I have argued that God either causes pain or permits it. In either case, he wills its existence, and this for a higher good. I do not believe it is just “one” higher good. Rather, many different goods exist because pain exists and therefore justifies, in my opinion, its existence. Some are:

a) The opportunity to be free enough to make certain choices which would be impossible unless pain were present
b) The contrastive good that is afforded by being delivered from pain which would otherwise be impossible to experience
c) The understanding/knowledge that is gained by either suffering from another out of love, or having another suffer for you out of love - such a knowledge and expression of love would not be possible unless pain existed.

I do not claim that ALL good must need involved in pain somehow. There are certainly choices that do not require pain to be enjoyed, and good which do not require contrast to be enjoyed, and knowledge of love that does not require pain to understand/appreciate. Nevertheless, the goods outlined above are possible goods that would not be present in the universe if pain did not exist.

Indeed, I am not even saying that evil “necessarily” must exist. I’m not sure it is coherent to say that anything in God’s creation “must” exist - as if I must exist or this planet. Things dependent on God’s will, if he is free, do not necessarily exist. It’s sort of like saying “why didn’t God create x universe instead of y?” Well what does it matter, so long as what he made is as good as it can be? Aquinas thought that God could always make better than he did make - for every world he made, he could make another better one - but what he did in fact make, he made as perfect as he could. Perhaps it is then incoherent to talk about things being “necessary” or not. What I am saying is that perhaps the above goods are such that JUSTIFY God’s permitting evil - not that they show how evil is “necessary.” If I have implied or said otherwise I apologize.

Sorry Chrisguy, I really didn’t mean it to come across as dismissive. I just don’t have the stomach, time or answers to do your questions justice. Would have been better if I shut up and said nothing. Apologies.

Chris, I’ve been thinking and writing on this theodicy, too. I haven’t encountered it elsewhere before, but was heartened to see you laying it out here :slight_smile: I think it is the most compelling theodicy I have been able to find or formulate, both in philosophical terms and as an answer with some practical application.

I’ll note that I take providing a theodicy as an effort to provide a compelling response to the logical problem of evil. I’m not satisfied with the theodicies of “freedom” or “soul formation” that are commonly on offer, and I think that “overcoming” can be much more tightly constructed than theodicies for either of these. I also think, in its connections with Christus Victor theology, it has a long associated tradition in church history (even if the tradition has not been formally formulated as a theodicy), and while I am not really a universalist, I also think it happens to be highly compatible with universalism.

So to be clear: by overcoming, what I have in mind is every tear being wiped away, evil being completely overcome through Christ-like love, complete healing, regeneration and restoration of the cosmos, etc. The most grandiose, glorious kind of absolute victory over the power of sin and death that can be imagined, and then more. I think that is a pretty fair representation of a pretty common Christian vision of Christ’s ultimate victory. And I think it provides a ground on which to provide the basic thing that a theodicy is generally seen to need to provide: a greater good that can only be achieved if the evils are permitted. I think your post answered Paidion’s question quite well: “In what sense might it be better?” To this, you can also add narrative goodness (it is a better story), the joy and exultation of victory, the experience of a certain kind of gratitude, and much more. I also think that if a theodicy of overcoming is firmly in place, it makes room for a morally defensible version of “narrative” “soul forming” and “freedom” theodicies in a subsidiary role. Narrative goodness, for example, as a higher good would seem monstrous if it were the only good being served…it could be used to justify torture out of a sadistic interest in telling a better story, for example. I think freedom and soul formation, without overcoming, also become morally monstrous in a similar way, if they are made to bear the full burden of providing a theodicy. But I think that “overcoming” is immune to at least some of the most pressing concerns related to complicity that come with any theodicy.

A lot of people don’t like this. There is a lot of hand-waving about the problem of evil, a lot of saying, “Yes, that is one of the most profound mysteries of faith.” And a lot of sage advice that we should be slow to theodicize. Pastorally, I think this is all good advice. Evil needs to be confronted and overcome, much more than it needs to be theodicized about. People who are suffering often just need you to shut up and be with them, not provide them with some nice snappy philosophy. A theodicy is just a theodicy, and not a solution to evil. But I think this is a good theodicy, doing the job that a theodicy should, better than any other theodicy I am aware of. I think you are right to suggest that “overcoming” is the basis for a strong, simple, effective, logically tight, morally defensible, practically useful, Biblically compatible theodicy that draws deeply on the Christian tradition. As far as I know, it is still relatively novel to formulate it in quite this way. I’d encourage you to keep working on it :slight_smile: And if anyone knows of prominent formulations of this theodicy, I’d love to hear about it. Certainly, “freedom” is the main one that generally comes up; it is even the one that comes up when people say they are against providing theodicies! But, for example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy doesn’t mention it at all, and I’ve never heard it mentioned before. Not much of a literature review, but the argument is either novel, or (far more likely) it is just not widely known in popular discourse. Either way, I think it deserves to be widely known!

I think this is a very helpful idea.

I draw on an analogy from thermodynamics. Useful work can be done only if energy can flow from hot to cold. If a system is at thermal equilibrium, no work can be done, and nothing interesting can happen.

In Genesis, we begin with God filling heaven with light (goodness). The earth below remains in darkness (evil). He separates light and darkness. ie. God breaks the good/evil equilibrium, creating an enormous ethical tension in which interesting things can happen. The rest of history is all about the flow of light into the darkness, doing creative work in the process. At the eschaton, when the whole earth is filled with heavenly light, no more work can be done. It will be a Day of Rest. (God only knows what the next week will bring…)

This is a pretty common idea to get God off the hook.

But tell me, what possible higher good(s) could come the atrocities which are committed in the world today (which God supposedly “permits”). I’m thinking of the horrible tortures that are going on, the rape and murder of little girls, the starvation and horrible treatment of the Jews under Hitler’s regime. In the news, I recently read of a man who abused his wife by pouring boiling water over her. I hate to bring up the details of these atrocities, but I feel it necessary in order to illustrate how ludicrous the idea is, that God would “permit” all of this terrible suffering in order to bring about a higher good. Couldn’t the almighty God bring about this “higher good” in some other way? After all, He is omnipotent. And why does He never reveal what this “higher good” is?

I have a different way to explain to (partially) explain the problem of evil, which I hope to get to in a later post. The problem has been debated for centuries, and I don’t think anyone has yet come up with a completely satisfying answer. Yet, I think the limited explanations which I will attempt to offer, may help.