The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Thoughts on Leibniz?

Leiniz said “I admit the supreme freedom of God, but I do not confuse it with indifference of equipoise, as if he could act without reason.”

gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm

But if God needed a reason for everything He did, how could we end up with a universe where His Son became incarnate in one particular solar system, on a planet that rotates counter-clockwise, where He would see the sun rise in the east and set in the west, when He could have been incarnated in some other solar system, on a planet that rotated clockwise (like our own Venus), where He would have seen the sun rise in the west and set in the east.

Is it logical to claim that any of these details were somehow necessary to God’s plan?

What reason could He have had for decreeing that the planet to host human life, where His Son would incarnate, must rotate counter-clockwise instead of clockwise?

And if God can’t act without a reason (as Leibniz claims), and there’s really no reason to choose counter-clockwise over clockwise, wouldn’t God Himself be immobilized between two equally good alternatives, without any inclination towards either (the indifference of equipoise, as Leibniz called it)?

How then could Christian Theism (which maintains that God chose this planet to be unique in at least one way) be true?

P.S. I know the theory that God created a mutiverse might be one answer, but I’m interested in all thoughts here.

[size=150]Here’s another quote from Leibniz.[/size]

criticalreview.com/crf/jf/diss/ch7_voluntarism.pdf
[size=150]
So if “by the principle of sufficient reason, free will, even God’s free will, does not escape causality…,” by what stretch of the imagination could God have been caused to choose the present direction of earth’s rotation (as opposed to the opposite direction) by an internal “criterion of goodness”?

I honestly don’t understand how anyone can defend this when there are so many things in this universe that seem like they must be arbitrary?

**Would God be less good if the sun rose in the west?

would God be less good if a snowflake had seven points instead of 6?

Would He be less good if there were eight continents instead of seven?**

How could such choices be based on some internal necessity arising from God’s benevolent nature?

And if an indifference of equipoise among plural alternatives would “make choosing itself impossible,” how could God ever have decided that the sun should rise in the east, a snowflake should have 6 points, or there should be seven continents (not to mention the precise number of planets in the solar system, or stars in the milky way)?[/size]

I’m not convinced that there ARE such things as “equally good possibilities” in God’s mind when he is considering making a decision.

Now, you bring up an example of a snow flake having certain sides, or the earth spinning a certain way, etc. all things of which you see no logical reasoning behind, only arbitrariness. But – and here is my point – maybe there are all sorts of harmonious relationships existing in the universe that you and I aren’t privy to. The example I gave was a Beethoven symphony. Do you think every note that you can’t explain has no rational purpose to Beethoven? Compare a poem you’ve read when you were younger to reading it with a college professor. You simply cannot see a lot of the reasons for placing words of a certain kind, with a certain sound, etc. in the places they are. The poet sees much more clearly his reasons than you do.

I suspect it may be the same case with the universe. A snowflake by itself has no relation to anything around it. But when placed in context it develops contextual meaning. A spinning globe by itself would only arbitrarily be spinning a certain way, but when placed in context, etc… Another example would be if a doctor asked you a seemingly arbitrary question: do you drink grapefruit juice? You can’t understand why he’d ask, so you assume it’s senseless. It turns out, however, that grapefruit juice inhibits an enzyme in your body that helps you safely metabolize the cholesterol medicine you’re taking.

Have you ever heard of the golden mean and golden ratio? Perhaps a similar idea is worked out on a universal scale, only we cannot see it.

But God chooses the context.

In our solar system there are seven (or eight) planets spinning counter-clockwise, and one (Venus) spinning clockwise.

Even if there’s some great hidden meaning or beauty in that ratio, wouldn’t it be unaltered if Venus were spinning counter-clockwise, and all the other planets were spinning clockwise, and wouldn’t God still have to decide between two equally good alternatives?

Even if you liken the universe to a symphony, wouldn’t God still have to decide which key to play it in?

I don’t think it’s right to say God chooses “context” as such. That would be like saying he chooses “value” as such. Now some - Ockhamists, I believe - say that God’s will “chooses” everything, even morality.

This view doesn’t make sense to me, because the logical conclusion would be that God’s will acts unguided by a mind, and therefore irrationally. If we conclude that God cannot do the intrinsically impossible (not all conclude this - i.e. Ockham I believe doesn’t, nor Descartes), then we must conclude his will operates under certain constraints – presumably, I would say, his reason.

I don’t think you understood my question.

You suggest that if we could look at the big picture, even things that seem totally arbitrary would have a reason (when viewed in the context of other things.)

Right?

But wouldn’t that make the value of one thing being the way it is relative to the way something else is?

And since God created “the big picture” aren’t you just pushing the problem back?

Say that an Earth that spun clockwise somehow wouldn’t strike it’s note in the divine symphony because it wouldn’t be spinning in the opposite direction of Venus, doesn’t that make any value it’s counterclockwise rotation might have relative to Venus’s clockwise rotation?

And since God chose both, wouldn’t He still have had to decide between two equally good alternatives (i.e. “I can make Earth spin counter-clockwise, and Venus spin clockwise; or I can make Earth spin clockwise, and Venus spin counter-clockwise”)?

And if an indifference of equipoise among plural alternatives would “make choosing itself impossible” (as Leibniz said), wouldn’t God still have been unable to make that choice?

But Earth and Venus are not exact equals and the comparison fails. I’m suggesting that maybe there are metaphysical concepts in God’s mind that have inherent value to them. Things like size, form, color,matter, sentience. Aquinas would say that all such ideas are manifestations in some way of the divine essence, pieces of God expressed. Now, if this is true, that would mean that combinations of those concepts could be perfectly harmonious. The idea is not that God sees all things as having the same value; rather he sees certain reflections of himself as more closely approaching himself. And if he so orders such approaches in a way that he sees intrinsically valuable, then there you go.

That is interesting.

But are you suggesting that the sun rising in the east somehow reflects God better than the sun rising in the west would?

Can you actually conceive (or help me conceive) of that being true in some way?

No I can’t, but again, the entire universe’s workings would need to be known to see what I’m getting at. The best example I can give is some sort of universal golden mean.

If this is what you mean by “the golden mean,” I don’t really see how it applies?

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_mean_%28philosophy%29

Help me here.

What are you talking about?

How could this have anything to do with why our sun rises in the east, why all alphabets appear to go back to the Poenecian, and all start with the same sound, why human life was created (or evolved) here on this planet (where the sun does rise in the east, and where our alphabets start with this particular sound), and why God’s Son was born here on this particular planet (with these particular peculiarities), when it would appear that all this could have been different without detracting from God’s goodness in anyway?

I’m not trying to be flip or argumentative, I’m trying to understand your pov.

I wasn’t familiar with the term “golden mean,” I googled it, this is what I came up with, and if this is what you’re using as a analogy, I don’t get it.

P.S. I don’t know if this makes sense, and I don’t know if ontologicalme is saying the same thing you are, but I would be interested in your thoughts on his comments (from another forum, his comments in bold type.)

Re: Principle of sufficient reason
« Reply #20 on: Today at 10:26:00 PM »

Quote from: ontologicalme on Today at 10:07:17 PM

Quote from: Mike

    Does the principle of sufficient reason imply that nothing is arbitrary?


**Seems to me, that, the answer is no, as, the principle of sufficient reason does not apply to axioms, since, axioms  by definition are propositions with no need of justification . The principle of sufficient reason, in this case, merely implies that within a system all else should be explained from the systems axioms.**

Quote from: Mike

    and there had to be a sufficient reason for God to chose a counter-clockwise direction for the earth's rotation (rather than a clockwise direction)?

**
Maybe there is a sufficient reason for such facts, but some of them could be axiomatic divine prescriptions**.

Quote from: Mike

    And does it imply that God would be unable to do anything, if doing something required Him to make some arbitrary choice (like maybe choosing between clockwise and counter-clockwise)?


**Again, then, God can take axiomatic Providences and decisions and all else should have a sufficient reason explained based on such divine axioms.


Notice, I am not saying this is how it is, all I am trying to show is that there is logical avenue , which could fit very well, together, the principle of sufficient reason and a God´s free will.

So it does not follow deductively that one hinders the other, necessarily.**

Thank you.

Quote from: ontologicalme on Today at 10:07:17 PM

Quote from: Mike Burke on Today at 08:17:27 PM

    O.K.

    To try and get this thread back on topic:

    Quote from: ontologicalme on January 13, 2013, 09:59:33 PM

        Quote from: Mike Burke on January 13, 2013, 05:33:32 PM


            So how would Leibniz explain the sun rising in the east instead of the west?


        Quote from: ontologicalme on Today at 10:07:17 PM

            **If it does not apply to axioms, perhaps, it does not apply to God´s choices, as they could be considered as some type of divine axioms.**



        Should I assume my post solved it?



    Quote from: Mike

        How could your suggestion about axioms explain why our sun rises in the east, why all alphabets appear to go back to the Poenecian (and all start with the same sound), why human life was created (or evolved) here on this planet (where the sun does rise in the east, and where our alphabets start with this particular sound), and why God's Son was born here on this particular planet (with these particular peculiarities), when it would appear that all this could have been different without detracting from God's goodness in anyway?

        If Leibniz was right when he said "free will, even God's free will, does not escape causality; it is simply subject to causality of a different type than that affecting concepts or physical objects: an internal form of causality in which a criterion of goodness (a final cause) takes the place of an external force (an efficient cause)" and if "an indifference of equipoise among plural alternatives would make choosing itself impossible," wouldn't it be impossible for God to choose between east and west, clockwise and counterclockwise, the "ah" sound and all the other possible sounds our alphabets could have begun with, etc., etc.?


        Leibniz seems to have been quit brilliant at times.

        How could he have overlooked this?

        How would he answer it?

        Can anybody else?


    **Those are all interesting questions, and I might try to answer a couple of them at some other moment, when I have more time to spare**


Please do.

Your thoughts are interesting.

THANK YOU.

The idea I’m trying to draw from the golden mean is that of a large/universal harmony in things seemingly unrelated. If it – or something like it – was stamped on the universe as a whole, it would serve essentially as the principle of sufficient reason for why certain seemingly arbitrary traits of the universe are the way they are.

I’m suggesting you stretch your perception a bit, and try to combine these ideas:

  • universal harmony with objective value in God’s mind
  • our inability to perceive the totality of the universe
  • our inability to perceive the universe in all the same modes as God

Just because you see no value in certain sense perceptions – in your alphabet analogy – or the orientation of certain objects in space – doesn’t mean such phenomena have no meaning at all in the mind of their creator. As I’ve repeatedly said, an artist sees all sorts of things in his painting or symphony that you simply do not see. That’s not to say such things are incomprehensible to you. No doubt, if a professor lectures you a painting or music piece, you will start seeing more depths of meaning, but, until you are enlightened, the stuff may appear to you arbitrary.

Note also that arbitrariness is not equivalent to contradiction. We can mentally live with seeming arbitrariness;not so with contradiction.

Thank you.

Someone on another forum brought up something I find interesting, but…

1.) I don’t think it’s related to what you’re saying here, and…

2.) I’m not sure if it could possibly be part of the answer, or if it just deepens the problem.

I would like your thoughts.

The poster I’m thinking of said that the earth rotates counter-clockwise if you look down on it from the south pole, but clockwise if you look down on it from the north pole.

I never really thought about that, but does it help?

If east and west, up and down, right and left really have no meaning from God’s POV, does it mean He never really had to make such choices, or does it just make all of them even more arbitrary?

Does this make any sense to anyone?

If I could understand this, maybe it would answer my question.

Does anyone understand it?

I just posted this reply (and I welcome all thoughts.)

Here’s something I was reading about free will last night.
**
A third treatment of free will takes as its starting point the claim that agency involves a sensitivity to certain reasons. An agent acts with free will if she is responsive to the appropriate rational considerations, and she does not act with a free will if she lacks such responsiveness. To see what such a view amounts to, consider again the case of Allison and her decision to walk her dog. A reasons-responsive view of the will says that Allison’s volition to walk her dog is free if, had she had certain reasons for not walking her dog, she would not have decided to walk her dog. Imagine what would have happened had Allison turned on the television after waking from her nap and learned of the blizzard before deciding to walk her dog. Had she known of the blizzard, she would have had a good reason for deciding not to walk her dog. Even if such reasons never occur to her (that is, if she doesn’t learn of the blizzard before her decision), her disposition to have such reasons influence her volitions shows that she is responsive to reasons. Thus, reasons-responsive views of the will are essentially dispositional in nature.
Coercion and manipulation undermine free will, on this view, in virtue of making agents not reasons-responsive. If Allison has been brainwashed to walk the dog at a certain time, then even if she were to turn on the news and sees that it is snowing, she would attempt to walk the dog despite having good reasons not to. Thus, manipulated agents are not reasons-responsive, and in virtue of this lack free will. [See Fischer and Ravizza (1998) for one of the primary reasons-responsive views of free will.]**

iep.utm.edu/freewill/#SH2c

That kind of definition of free will makes sense to me, and fits in well with a soul-making theodicy, but I don’t see where it really leaves room for a free agent to truly make random or arbitrary choices.

But isn’t choosing one perfectly red shirt over another perfectly red shirt a wholly arbitrary choice, and wouldn’t that just deepen the problem?

Taken separately, earth and venus may rotate in the same direction depending on what angle they’re viewed from, but looked at together, they’re rotating in opposite directions no matter how you look at them.

To create that opposite effect, one has to be rotating clockwise when looked down on from it’'s north pole, and one has to be rotating counterclockwise when looked down on from it’s north pole.

They may have an equivalence relation, and they may be analogous to the two red shirts, but they’re not the same shirt.

It seems to me that God would still have to choose "does earth rotate clockwise when looked down upon from it’s north pole, or does venus?

Do I choose this perfectly red shirt, or that perfectly red shirt?

And isn’t that just what

Of course north and south are meaningless in space, and any differences is relative, but doesn’t that make the choice of which does what even more random and arbitrary?

And isn’t that just the kind of “indifference of equipoise among plural alternatives” that Leibniz said would “make choosing itself impossible”?

Quote

Either there is no choice ( clockwise or counterclockwise), as they are equivalent  (possessing the mentioned  attributes) , or they are not equivalent and their should be sufficient reason to pick one rather than the other.

But wouldn’t any such sufficient reason have to be based in God’s nature (i.e. His goodness, love, justice, wisdom or mercy)?

And how could something like “earth will move in this direction when looked down upon from it’s north pole, and venus will move in this (opposite direction) when looked down upon from it’s north pole” be based in any such divine attribute?

If this is true, it would certainly seem to answer a lot of questions.

ryerson.ca/~kraay/Documents/Multiverse%20Papers/Collins.pdf

I think this is the same old argument which determinists make in trying to show that WE do not have libertarian free will.
They say all of our “choices” are determined by prior causes. They say there’s a REASON for your choices. They’re not random, so they must be caused. Because of these causation factors, all the choices we make could not have been otherwise. The only difference is this case is that Leibniz applies the deterministic argument to God’s choices.

The ramifications of determinism are immense! I cannot be held morally responsible for ANY of my actions, for I could not have done otherwise. And so with everybody else.

As for me, I believe in libertarian free will. This is, for any choice which I had already made, I could have chosen otherwise. For exmple, today I went outside and helped a neighbour take apart a metal shelter on my land, a shelter which I gave to him. I could have chosen to stay inside and let him take it apart himself. All because of my libertarian free will. But according to determinism, I could NOT have done the latter, because there were a number of causal factors which determined my assisting the neighbour.

The early Christians wrote articles which affirmed free will and denied fatalism (which asserts that SOME events are pre-determined, as opposed to determinism which asserts that ALL events are determined.)

If I understand this correctly, I think Leibniz would have agreed with you.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/

I know this is an old thread, but I am confused at why the sun setting in the west has to be superior to the sun setting in the east? Instead I would say that God makes good good, and therefore, by creating as he does, he makes that good. If he created it the other way , it would then be good, but he did not.

The other thing is that he created us to take in the universe as it is.