The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Every Libertarian Freewill a Random Decision Generator?

This was posted on another Forum, and I was wondering how many of you here (who believe in LFW) would agree with it?

The part I have a problem with is “He wouldn’t need to know the mechanism. There is no mechanism. It’s just his supernatural will. And if he wills it to be random it is random.”

Any thoughts?

These are my currant thoughts (and I posted this reply on that forum.)

First let me say - what a breath of fresh air to read your posts Michael! I’ve read through a few of your posts here on the philosophy forum and find your respect for reason and distaste of ambiguity similar to my own. Appeals to authority or anything other than reason, for that matter, are a waste of time in my opinion, and if people think they are getting around that by giving other reasons that “have nothing to do with reason” or that go above it or beyond it or what have you, they are mistaken. Such answers are reasons all the same. Aristotle said something like, we either choose to philosophize or choose not to, but in so choosing we philosophize all the same.

But now to your post. The issues you bring up are very interesting to me and I’ve thought about them most of my life. To be up front, I don’t believe in libertarian free will. I find the concept absurd, because I cannot imagine a will making a choice undirected and uninformed by a mind. And what the mind chooses - i.e. its knowledge and valuation of goods - is not something that is chosen. The greatest valuation made by the mind determines the action. We do things, in other words, because our strongest desires prompt us to. And even if we refrain from a strong desire, it is only because another has taken its place, i.e. the desire NOT to do the previously desired action. How the mind works is, in my opinion, mechanical and calculating. Deductive. There’s no reason to use negative language here. It’s not “cold” or “cruel.” I’m making no value statement here, merely describing how it works. I cannot imagine, as you say so well, a motiveless action.

You bring up an interesting point - how could God then choose to actualize two sets of affairs if he doesn’t deem one more valuable than the other? I don’t think he could choose one. Here are some of my initial thoughts (I definitely want to discuss these issues more, just not around a computer at the moment; I will be tonight however.)

Maybe all possible scenarios are actualized. Maybe there are an infinite number of universes which actualize everything that possibly could be actualized?

Maybe there is a hidden harmony inaccessible to us, something that pleases God to behold, some higher rule that governs his decision making? Aquinas and the scholastics saw everything in terms of spheres or orders. Maybe that idea can be applied on a cosmic and microcosmic scale for God - an intrinsic value system he has as part of his nature that judges certain things to r higher goods? Or maybe he beholds some universal symphony when planet x is this big, planet y is that color, and planet z spins such and such way?

Just some initial thoughts.

Michael, libertarian free will has no relation to randomness. An act arising from free will is not random; it is chosen.

Those who hold to determinism do not allow the existence free will. They insist that an act must be either predetermined or random. In effect, they deny the existence of free will agents. In other words, they denies the existence of PERSONS!

This is what puzzles me so much. Those who hold to determinism (both “soft” and “hard” determinism) are themselves free will agents, and yet they deny the existence of free will agents.

But (from a Christian POV) wouldn’t that have The Son incarnating and suffering as a man in an infinite number of universes?

I guess it would also mean an infinite number of resurrections and ascensions, but I have a real hard time wrapping my mind around this.

Do an infinite number of Easter Sundays make up for an infinite number of crucifixions?

Does an infinite amount of happiness outweigh an infinite amount of suffering?

I can’t really get my mind around that either, but please say more.

But chosen for a reason right?

If you chose chocolate, it’s because you like chocolate, isn’t it?

And if you choose something else, isn’t it because you prefer something else (or maybe because there’s only one chocolate bar, and you know your grandson likes chocolate, or even because you’re diabetic, and you don’t want to go into a coma)?

The point is that (even if you’re unaware of it), isn’t there a reason for any choice you make?

Could you wake up one morning and say “I’m diabetic, I hate chocolate, I don’t want to die and I don’t like being sick, but I think I’ll choose to have a few chocolate bars for breakfast and have a diabetic coma today”?

Would you be any more “a person” if you could do that?

I don’t subscribe to the idea that the crucifixion was necessary in terms of forgiving mankind (though it may have been necessary in that, knowing God’s nature, he could not have done anything BUT voluntarily came into the creation he made to suffer with that creation.) Either way, God would still prefer to enter his creation and be crucified than not do so (or else he would not have done so), so in a way it is not difficult for me to imagine him doing so.

How do we know God has not entered the creation in all sorts of other ways than becoming a human?

I’m not convinced that God could not have a reason for NOT making an infinite number of universes. I’m also not sure it is possible to have two exactly equal alternative choices. So long as there are differences in the items, there would be different preferences and placements in the universe. I’m not entirely sure it is possible to have two of the “exact” same things.

As to the scholastic notion, I’m only saying that maybe there are all sorts of values God puts on things that we can’t even see. Do you think we could understand or appreciate one of Beethoven’s symphonies as much as a pianist? What about compared to Beethoven himself? There are probably all sorts of levels of harmony to God’s creation we cannot even see.

Sure — chosen for a reason. Thus, your choice is not RANDOM, for RANDOM implies no reason.

But neither does a reason imply cause. The fact that you had a reason for your choice in no way indicates that your choice was not freely made. You, yourself, are the cause of your action.

No matter how much you like chocolate, you could have chosen not to eat it. My wife is a great chocolate lover. But she often choose not to eat it. “Oh, then there must have been a reason for her choosing not to eat it,” you say. Yes, there was — the reason being that she wants to maintain good health. However, in spite of that, she could have chosen to have the chocolate on those occasions. “Oh, but there must have been a reason for her choosing to eat the chocolate on those occasions!” Yes, there was. She had a strong desire for chocolate on those occasions, but she could have resisted the impulse. “Oh, but if she had resisted the impulse, then there must have been a reason for that,” … and so on, ad infinitum. But it doesn’t matter whether or not she had a reason on each and every one of those occasions. The point is that she could have chosen otherwise on each and every one of those occasions. Thus she has libertarian free will!

Do you understand what Leibniz said here?

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason

Can you explain it to me?

Can you relate it to some of the questions I’ve asked about choices it would appear that God would have had to make (like shall I set earth spinning clockwise or counter-clockwise)?

For the benefit of anyone who may have been effected by some of my posts on topics like this, I feel I should share some helpful feedback I’ve gotten from Prof. Talbott, and a Philosopher/Theologian, Thomist (Anglican) Priest with universalist leanings (who’ve Ive learned to respect, and who I’'ve learned chooses his words very carefully when discussing complicated philosophical issues–which is why I’ll underline a couple of words and phrases that I found interesting after reading Prof. Talbott’s comments, and Aaron’s thoughts.)

In part, Prof. Talbott directed me to this.

willamette.edu/~ttalbott/Universalism.pdf

Now, my Priest friend (who’s comments are in blue, and who will remain anonymous.)

(Personal Correspondence.)

I’ve found both of these responses (and Aaron’s pm, which seems to tie in with the views expressed here, and which I reproduce below) thoughtful, helpful, and well intentioned (and it’s my hope, that if I’ve undermined anyone’s faith here, they may find them helpful too.)

(Aaron, PM.)