The Evangelical Universalist Forum

Does Love Require LFW?

Tom, perhaps I’ve misunderstood you. I don’t think I’ve really grasped Compatibilism and so Mel’s very helpful and I appreciate his input.

I’m not sure that it makes sense to say one is libertarianly free withing constraints. To me it’s likes saying, one is free while enslaved. If God has determined that you end up at location A rather then B, then we choosing freely don’t really have an ability to choose to go to B. So I think I’m not getting it. If you say, we’ll he’ll let you choose to go to B (on a temporary basis) well then you’ve left the argument. Now the question would have to be re-framed: Does God determine us to first go to B and then end up at A? If we say, no, because that would violate LFW, then we’ve accomplished nothing to prove the point - it’s begged. If we say, yes, then it’s determinism. I need to hear more why God ONLY determines the ends and not the means, especially in light of the tons of calvinistic scriptures which show God CONTROLLING our behavior and will.

Aug

Aug: I’m not sure that it makes sense to say one is libertarianly free within constraints. To me it’s like saying one is free while enslaved.

Tom: Try not to think of constraints in terms of enslavement. It follows that whatever enslaves us constrains us, but it doesn’t follow constrains necessarily enslave us. Constraints can be neutral. For example, one’s ‘nature’ can constrain. You’re not free to breathe under water like a fish, or to fly unaided through the air like a bird. Those are constraints or limitations on the options you’re free to choose between.

Aug: If God has determined that you end up at location A rather then B, then we choosing freely don’t really have an ability to choose to go to B.

Tom: Assuming that LFW is possible (for the sake of argument), all your description requires is that you’re determined to “end up” at A and not B. But you’re free to “go” to B—maybe even spend quite some time there. You just can’t “end up” at B. B can’t be your final destiny. You can only “end up” (whatever that means) at A. That much can be determined. But God might leave it entirely up to you ‘when’ and ‘how’ you get to A. You may be free to take the high road or the low road, the easy way or the way of suffering. The important thing (assuming the coherence and possibility of both compatibilist and libertarian freedom) is that both are possible within the span of a life and regarding different aspects. It just can’t be the case that we’re compatiblistically and libertarianly free with respect to one and the same choice.

Aug: If you say, we’ll he’ll let you choose to go to B (on a temporary basis)…

Tom: As I just did!

Aug: …well then you’ve left the argument. Now the question would have to be re-framed: Does God determine us to first go to B and then end up at A? If we say, no, because that would violate LFW, then we’ve accomplished nothing to prove the point - it’s begged. If we say, yes, then it’s determinism.

Tom: Whether or not God determines all our choices (in which case we’re compatibilistically free all the time about all our choices) is a separate issue from the question of what compatibilistic and libertarian freedom are. In other words, whether or not God exhaustively determines us doesn’t bear on the definition of the terms. I thought we were just discussing the terms for a bit. And as far as the definitions go, it’s perfectly possible for us to be compatibilistically free in some respects and libertarianly free in other. There’s nothing about the ‘definitions’ of CFW and LFW that require that we be ONLY one or the other in EVERY respect. That’s all Melchi and I were getting at.

Aug: I need to hear more why God ONLY determines the ends and not the means, especially in light of the tons of calvinistic scriptures which show God CONTROLLING our behavior and will.

Tom: Right. I wasn’t suggesting with Melchi that God only determines the ends and not the means. I didn’t think that was in view. He and I were just talking about whether one could be partly determined and partly undetermined.

Tom

Hi Tom!

You said:

But why do you think it follows from our being finite that our characters cannot be compatibilistically acquired? If the loving character of a finite being in heaven can be maintained by compatibilistic choice, why can’t it be acquired by compatibilistic choice?

I believe evil is a negative moment in the explication of beauty, in that it provides a negative contrast for the full understanding and appreciation of beauty by finite beings. I just don’t think we could fully enjoy and appreciate health (which is surely a good) if there was never any sickness (which is an evil) from which anyone needed to be healed. In my experience at least, a temporary negative experience tends to enhance and make more meaningful whatever positive experience succeeds it. But perhaps these are just two different and conflicting intuitions that we have.

I also think God has always wanted to manifest himself to his finite creatures as a Savior. Evil, I believe, highlights good and allows God to manifest himself more fully to his creatures. To be saved from evil is, I believe, a greater blessing to man than never experiencing evil. There is a joy that comes from being saved from evil - and knowing that one has been saved from evil - that I believe is far superior to the alternative. One could say that being saved from evil is more beautiful than never having to be saved from evil. In fact, I’m not sure how an existence in which there is and never was anything with which to contrast “beauty” could even be considered “beautiful.” I’m not saying that evil has to eternally exist alongside good (as I believe was Edwards’ view), but I do believe that finite beings depend on contrast, and that our existence must at least begin in a context in which evil is a reality.

I don’t see how my point is any less relevant, though. God’s character isn’t any less his just because it’s compatibilistically chosen by himself. Why should our character be any less ours just because it’s compatibilistically chosen by us?

Tom,

I don’t see what you’ve explained as LFW. IF the end is determined then how can any free choices inbetween really be relevant? If love is the end goal, and all choices lead to love, then why is freedom even necessary at all? It seems that since the ends are determined then the means are as well, that’s my point. For if the ends are determined so much that either the low road or the high road will end there, then there’s no point in choosing the low road or the high road, it all leads to the same destination. So the question I have is do you believe God has determined our ends or do you believe we’re free to choose our end destination?

Aug: I don’t see what you’ve explained as LFW.

Tom: I didn’t explain what is was and how it differed from CFW?

Aug: IF the end is determined then how can any free choices in between really be relevant?

Tom: It’s a good question. But it takes us beyond DEFINING LFW. You wanted to know what LFW was, right? I thought that’s what we were on. If you think such freedom is irrelevant, OK. That’s a separate discussion. But to anticipate it, the in between libertarian choices can be relevant to the outcome IF the outcome is determined in the sense of a fixed destination with open routes and without fixed time-tables AND if the end is embraced libertarianly. God can fix the ultimate destination (of fully realized loving human being) and basically say, “OK, that’s your destiny. You wander until you come home to me. You’re aimless and without purpose until you choose me. Now go for it,” and leave open to us much about how we get there and when we get there, while whether we are ever able to settled ultimately on any other shore is out of the question. We will rest finally in God or not rest at all. WHEN we find that rest, and WHAT we have to go through to find it, etc., can be left up to us. I submit this is not irrelevant at all. LFW is HOW we achieve our destiny (in my view). That means there can’t be an absolute, fixed date, a line in the sand, where God says, “Enough rebellion! Be saved!” and boom, we’re saved. That soteriology is not an option to me. So we’ll differ here.

Aug: If love is the end goal, and all choices lead to love, then why is freedom even necessary at all?

Tom: All choices don’t lead to love. Some lead away from love. But if we travel away from our destiny, we can always choose our way back. It’s not that all paths lead TOWARD our destiny. Some do not. It’s that no path which leads away from our destiny can ESCAPE that destiny. As far as you travel away from God as your fulfillment and destiny, it will remain the case that he is your only home and refuge and choosing to submit can turn the tide.

Aug: It seems that since the ends are determined then the means are as well, that’s my point.

Tom: So if the end is “vacationing on the East Coast of Florida” then all the means to getting there are equally determined? Really? Isn’t vacationing in Florida compatible with flying or driving or taking a train to get there?

Aug: For if the ends are determined so much that either the low road or the high road will end there, then there’s no point in choosing the low road or the high road, it all leads to the same destination.

Tom: What if the high road glorifies God and the low road leads through sinful blasphemies and abuse? Are these really indifferent to God? Isn’t it better to love and worship God now SINCE that’s the determined fulfillment of our natures rather than deny our purpose and wander into suffering and ruin to have to discover the truth the hard way?

Aug: So the question I have is do you believe God has determined our ends or do you believe we’re free to choose our end destination?

Tom: Only GOD can be the end destination and fulfillment for any sentient creature. How could it be otherwise? How could a creature find final rest and fulfillment away from God? Not possible. So our destiny, i.e., what we are created FOR, that is, our PURPOSE and HOME, are God. We’re not free to negate that and determine some OTHER state of being as the final rest and fulfillment of our being. But we are free to wander from that end and search aimlessly for another. But since we really ARE made for God and only God, no wandering can succeed in escaping God and finding final rest through rejection of God. And we can wander as far and as long as we like. A thousand years, ten thousand, or ten million. We will never FIND the rest which our souls are programed to desire because only in God are those desires fulfilled.

Tom

Tom,
Thanks for bearing with me; I think my understanding of these issues is so small and minimal it’s hard for me to fully understand what people argue. So thanks for the patience.

I think I’ve mis-framed the question again.

But you’re saying not all roads lead there. For if the low road is “sins” and “blasphemies” and does not “lead to love” then there is only one road which leads to love (God’s predetermined final destination). And if there is only one road that leads to love then it seems having choices to love or not to love is not really free in a libertarian sense if they’re destination is fixed. So it seems to me that while you call it libertarian freedom, I view your position as soft determinism and I may wrong about that and am very open to correction about what is what :slight_smile:

Sorry, typo’d and had to make an edit in that last post.

Auggy: But you’re saying not all roads lead there. For if the low road is “sins” and “blasphemies” and does not “lead to love” then there is only one road which leads to love (God’s predetermined final destination).

Tom: Right. And we must choose this road to rest finally in love.

Auggy: And if there is only one road that leads to love then it seems having choices to love or not to love is not really free in a libertarian sense if they’re destination is fixed.

Tom: Let’s say I set you in a car in Seattle and told you that your “destination” was a vacation in Miami but that I only wanted people there who truly wanted to be there and that therefore you were free to drive toward Miami or to drive in some other direction BUT that you were NOT free to stop driving, park and settled down fulfilled and happy anywhere else but Miami with me. So your freedom to reject your destiny (i.e., your destination) is limited to endless wandering within the car. You can never arrive or park. You’re designed to drive until you are at home with me in Miami. THEN, and only then, can you end your journey and relax on the beach. See what I mean? Not all “directions” you take lead to Miami, but none can lead FINALLY away from Miami. All roads are “connected” to Miami. You can get to Miami (by heading towards Miami) from anywhere you might be. You do so by choosing (libertarianly) to do so. But choosing not to do so is not a destination, not a destiny, it’s just prolonging the journey.

We are hardwired by God FOR God. It’s not a violation of our freedom or nature to be so designed. God can’t create anything that isn’t at its core dependent upon him and the existence of which isn’t a ‘desiring’ or ‘yearning’ for him. This is how God created us and set us on this journey. So our journey can only end IN God. He is our destiny.

But (in my view) we must participate in arriving to this end by choosing (libertarianly) to do so. That’s partly HOW the longing which is the undeniable core of our being comes to find its rest in God. We can say ‘no’ to what is most natural to us, but we cannot extinguish the divine image or the longing that drives our journey. So you’ll be driven (no pun intended) to drive and drive and drive, looking for a place to finally park and rest, but you’ll find no place to stop and rest until you drive to Miami and join the party. It’s in THIS sense that all roads lead to God as our destiny; i.e., no road leads to an absolute severance from God, one can always find one’s way back to God. All roads don’t LEAD directly to God, but all roads are a) connected to God and b) can handle two-way traffic.

Thus, you have a fixed destination (in terms of being the only possible place we can end our journey and quench our undying thirst) but open routes (in terms of how long it’ll take you and what crap you’ll have to tolerate until you finally come to your senses and head toward Miami).

Tom

As someone new to this whole universalism thing, I just want to chime in and say how wonderful it is to see a discussion like this. For a Calvinist or Arminian, their whole theology practically hangs in the balance of whether LFW exists, and thus just about any debate on this issue turns really nasty quite quickly. As universalism doesn’t have to hang its hat on any particular view of free will, this seems to be one of the very few places one can find a deep yet cordial debate on the matter. It’s made for thought-provoking and pleasurable reading, so thanks guys!

Felkor,

Wait, no, I’m right! It’s all LFW! Has to be, has to be! You blankity blank #!*%^! :imp:

hehe.

Thanks

Tom

Felkor,
I so resonate with your observation. I feel that if one, being either Calvinist or Arminian, were to sit with Jesus and ask him such questions, he’d hardly get upset with the inquiree. When one really wants to understand God and his movements it’s hardly reasonable to get upset, when we ourselves hardly undestand these nuances.

TGB and I stand on two seperate ends of the spectrum and yet hold hands in faith. I’ve got a strong feeling, we’ll both learn that we were both wrong and that often things aren’t what they seem. In other words, I hardly doubt God will give a scientific answer to LFW/DET when we see him face to face. Perhaps it’s so above us that I’ll continue to hear the same answer…“don’t worry too much about that.”

Nevertheless, I read scripture as best as I can and pray God helps me to understand it. As I read it, God intervenes with us and causes things. Such as Abemilech, and God telling him “I kept you from sinning against me”. For me it does not matter if it’s software like causes (puppetry) or if it’s indirect (God using others to form our decision) - the point is we aren’t always free in a libertarian sense. So I ask, to what degree (quantity) is this so? But, I do see a different point of view from Talbott and TGB, which TGB has been so kind and patient to bringing me to understand.

It may be a bit simplistic but I like the illustration of playing chess with a Grand Master. The outcome is assured- he/ she will win but within the parameters of the game I make free choices of moves. Limited to a degree by their driving me in a particular direction.
God can direct our paths and we may respond in different ways.
It’s rather hard to imagine how God who knows the end or perhaps rather is already at the end being unrestricted by time (his invention) can at the same time (perhaps not a good word to use) give us free will but I think he does.

Even within our realm we wrestle with Quantum Mechanics that pose similar conundrums. Why should we expect to get our mind around God’s mechanisms.

I don’t see an assured end result being incompatible with free will.
Though If you’re going by the strict definition of LFW being “the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition or strongest desires” and “responsibility in this view, meaning that one could always have done otherwise” (not my defn) then I’m not sure what I’ve suggested is strictly LFW.

Does it have to be either Determinism or LFW?

Hi Tom!

You wrote:

Dangit…you’re right! Oh well; it was worth a try. :slight_smile:

I think I get what you’re saying here, too, but still I wouldn’t say it’s God’s will that determines that God should be good. While I think it’s true that God is good because he chooses and does that which is good, I believe God chooses and does that which is good because something other than his own will is determining that he choose and do that which is good - i.e., his nature. God does not and cannot, I believe, choose a different nature or different desires and motives by which to choose and act. So God’s nature (or the desires which are an expression of his nature) determines how God exercises his will. And so it is with us: just as what God chooses is determined by something other than his will, so what we choose is determined by something other than our will. Both God’s will and our will are, I believe, alike determined by antecedent causes. There’s still something “behind” each will, whether we’re talking about the choices of humans or of God.

My view is that to be a ‘person’ is to be a being with rational self-awareness. So in order for there to be a person other than God, a ‘first person perspective’ other than God’s must emerge. That is, I believe personal diversity simply requires that there be more than one first person perspective in existence, not that contingent beings make choices undetermined by antecedent causes (which is not even true of God, a necessary being). So I believe that what we choose can be ultimately predetermined by God without our losing our status as persons distinct from God. While I believe every choice I’ve ever made and ever will make was predetermined by God before I came into existence as a person, it’s still me - a being with a self-awareness and first-person perspective other than God’s - making the choices that it was predetermined I would make. God does not experience and is not conscious of himself as making the choices that he determined that I would make; while the choices I make have been predetermined by God, the proximate personal cause of the choices is me - a contingent being made in God’s image whose first person perspective and experience is different from God’s. For God to predetermine how a being with a first person perspective other than his own will choose presupposes that a being with a first person perspective (and thus, in my view, a person) other than God will be brought into existence, so I’m not sure how my position would entail pantheism. And while I believe all human persons are necessarily “responsible” in the sense of having a capacity to make choices that are governed by motives, I believe the unique first person perspective that makes a being personally distinct from God emerges before the personal being begins to make choices for which they can be considered morally responsible. While the moral choices we make can be thought of as being one aspect of our unique personal identity and existence (for while God has predetermined that we will make the choices, he’s not making them for us), the moral choices we make are not in themselves what make us personally distinct from God. Rather, what makes us personally distinct from God is first and foremost the unique first person perspective we possess that emerged before we even began to make moral choices.

Great stuff Aaron! I’ll have to put this on hold until the weekend. I’m out the door in a couple hours for vaca with the fam! And I’m NOT taking any of YOU guys along with me. :sunglasses:

Tom

Might as well post before I hit the road!

Something like that, yeah. I think it follows from God’s being necessarily good that his being good isn’t the product of an exercise of will since it is the exercise OF the will which necessary goodness is meant to encompass.

The deeper the waters get the more careful I wanna be. It’s like we’ve got God up on the table and are dissecting him!

I’m not sure I’d extrapolate ‘will’ entirely out of ‘nature’ and make them two different things, since when I think of a person’s nature I have in mind reason, will, emotions, dispositions, etc. So let me ask it this way, Aaron—Why can’t the ‘will’ just be compatibilistically good? I mean, when we talk about the ‘nature’ of God and say it has ‘necessary’ features, why can’t the goodness of the will be irreducible to something else? I mean, why can’t the will’s being compatibilistically good be a feature OF the will? You want to posit something antecedent to the will that accounts for its necessary exercise in love. But then won’t we want to account for the necessary goodness of that nature which determines the exercise of the will (ad infinitum)? We have to stop somewhere with that which IS itself goodness and love. I’m not sure why this can’t just BE the will of God. But I’m open.

But I do see where you’re going—if something antecedent to God’s will can determine that his will is always exercised in love, then we have a way to make sense of something antecedent to our will determining it and can then mount an argument for the possibility of God’s creating us necessarily good from the beginning of our existence and thus falsifying the claim that “love requires LFW” in the case of contingent beings. I’m not sure it works because it’s still the case that what’s antecedent to the divine will is still divine (i.e., the divine nature). In other words, God IS his nature, and so it’s still the case that nothing outside of God, nothing OTHER than God, determines God. It’s hard to see how this can be a parallel or analogy of something OTHER than us determining us.

I’d love to convince you to upgrade your view of ‘personhood’ and personal being. I don’t disagree that ‘persons’ are rationally self-aware and have unique first-person perspectives. That’s true. But I wouldn’t stop there. I’d want to insist that this perspective (the identity of its owner) is fully realized in personal terms through interaction with other such persons, so that true personhood is inherently relational. In other words, I’d link ‘personhood’ and ‘love’ (love being an irreducibly interpersonal reality). A LOT of work has been done on intersubjectivity and the irreducibly relational nature of reality. That’s where I’d go to argue the impossibility of the existence of a single/sole first-person perspective/monad. But that’s a whole nutha conversation!

Off to vacation!

Tom

Wow, good stuff guys. Much to think about…

Hi Tom! Hope you enjoyed your vacation with your family.

You wrote:

Yeah, I do think one should approach this topic of discussion with an attitude of reverence and humility, realizing that there is much about God that we will never be able to fully understand. But I also think that one of the wonderful things about our being made in God’s image is that we can at least begin to understand God, and that he wants us to use the rational faculty with which he created us to explore, as much as is possible, the depths of his nature and existence.

Well I understand the ‘will’ to be the faculty or power of rational beings to choose, and I understand ‘choice’ to be the act of the will in selecting an object. But I believe a being only chooses what the mind perceives to be good or desirable, and that the will would be completely inactive if there were no desire inclining a person to choose a certain way. So if there is no antecedent cause (e.g., a rational desire) that accounts for God’s choosing the way he does, it would, to me, mean that his will is either completely inactive or else arbitrary and irrational (rather than the expression of a rational nature). I can’t help but think that there must be something antecedent to the choice to account for why a person chose the way they did. Hope that makes sense.

But again, if there’s something other than God’s will that determines what God chooses then it would seem to me likely that there is something other than our will that determines what we choose. And since we’re contingent rather than necessary beings, it would seem that this “something” would have to be traced back to the source and cause of our nature and existence. While one could give a relative explanation for why a contingent being chose the way it did without going beyond its nature and desires, one could not, I don’t think, give an absolute explanation.

Hmm…I’m just not sure I could understand your view as an “upgrade” any more than I could view someone else’s view as an upgrade if they were to argue that a being with a first person perspective doesn’t become a person until it begins to love. That’s certainly more than what I’m arguing for, but it’s hardly something I would consider an “upgrade.” This would, I think, be confusing what a “person” is with the purpose (or one of the purposes) for which a person was brought into existence by God. IOW, it would, I think, be confusing what we are with what we were created for. I’m all about the importance of interpersonal relationships, and I certainly understand love to be inseparable from the purpose and goal for which we were created. But while you seem to be saying that persons are necessarily beings who are volitionally interacting with other persons, I believe persons are beings created by God for this relational activity. IOW, a contingent being acquires its full status and identity as a ‘person’ before it begins to volitionally interact with other persons in a loving (or unloving, as the case may be) relationship. I’m not sure how it could be any other way; in order for one person to interact with another person, it has to already be a person, right? That is, in order for one being to begin to be involved in an interpersonal relationship, it seems that it would have to already be a person. Otherwise we’d have non-personal beings who only become persons after they’ve begun to volitionally interact with other non-personal beings.

Aaron, I sympathize with your perspective. TGB, I sympathize with you perspective. LOL! - I too am enjoying you both just chit chatting away. Please don’t stop.

Also,

Shall I move the last few posts back to the other thread? Aaron accidetnally crossed. Let me know if you two are good with that.

Aug

Maybe we should put Aaron’s last post over where it belongs. It’s Tidier!

Tom

Then would any free choice for any sin be uninformed and irrational? IOW God’s fault? But, then, how could He hold humans responsible for their sins, judge & punish them? And how to explain the Scriptures, e.g. saying they are “without excuse”?